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Refracting the Spectrum of Clean Water 
Act Standing in Light of Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlye 
Karl S. Coplan* 
There is an inherent tension between constitutional standing 
doctrine and the citizens enforcement provisions of various federal 
environmental statutes. The Supreme Court's articulation of stand- 
ing doctrine under the Article I11 "case" or "controversy" require- 
ment imposes requirements of "injury in fact," "causation," and 
"redressability." These concepts do not neatly translate into citizen 
enforcement of environmental regulatory schemes. Such statutes 
are designed to prevent environmental injury before it is necessarily 
perceptible. They impose requirements on polluters to whom per- 
ceptible adverse impacts of pollution may not be directly traceable. 
And given the large number of potential sources of pollution to any 
particular environmental resource, relief against any one polluter 
may not necessarily be sufficient to "redress" the perceptible harms 
to the environmental resource. 
Despite the frequency with which standing issues have made it to 
the United States Supreme Court, the Court has given remarkably 
little guidance for application of standing doctrine in the citizen 
enforcement suit context. All of the Supreme Court's environmen- 
tal standing decisions have arisen in the context of citizen suits 
seeking to require compliance with environmental laws by govern- 
mental agencies and actors; there is no Supreme Court decision 
addressing standing doctrine in a case of a citizens enforcement 
action against a private party. The inquiry is compounded by con- 
tinued controversy about the extent to which Congress can, by stat- 
ute, create new legal interests the invasion of which would 
constitute an "injury in fact" sufficient to support Article I11 
standing. 
* Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. B A ,  Middlebuly College, 
1980; J.D., Columbia University, 1984. I am grateful to my colleague Ann Powers for review- 
ing a draft of this article. 
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Although widely viewed as a retrenchment in standing doctrine,' 
the Supreme Court's most recent standing decision, Lujan v. De- 
f& of has not settled this controversy. Indeed, a major- 
ity of the Court in that case specifically endorsed the ability of 
Congress to create newly recognizable injuries and chains of causa- 
tion. The Court's opinion in Defenders of Wildlife itself recognized a 
category of "procedural" rights in which the strict requirements of 
injury, causation, and redressability might not apply. 
Nowhere is this tension between Congress' statutory goals and 
strict application of constitutional standing requirements more pro- 
nounced than in the context of citizens enforcement actions under 
the federal Clean Water Act.% The Federal Water Pollution Control 
amendments of 1972 were enacted specifically to correct the previ- 
ous statutory regime, which required proof that a discharger's pol- 
lutants were causing perceptible harm to a water body that could be 
causally traced to that discharger's pollution for a prosecution to 
proceed. 
With the Clean Water Act, Congress adopted a system of dis- 
charge permits, monitoring reports, effluent limitations, and public 
review procedures in order to ensure that enforcement could pro- 
ceed without a showing of measurable harm to the receiving water 
body or strict causation traceable to a particular violator. And, in its 
citizen suit provision, Congress made equally clear its intention 
that, in the absence of state or federal enforcement, citizens should 
be able to enforce the Act's requirements on the same terms as the 
government. 
1. See genera& Robert Wiygul, GwalhEq, Eight Years Later: Proving Jurisdiction and Article 
111 Standing in Clean Water Act Citizen Suits, 8 Tul. Envtl. L. J. 435 (1995); Robert B. June, 
The Structure of Standing Requirements for Citizen Suits and the Scope of Congressional 
Power, 24 Envt'l L. 761 (1994); Harold Feld, Saving the Citizen Suit: the Effect of Lujan v. 
Def& of W U f e  and the Role of Citizens Suits & Environmental Enforcement, 19 Colum. 
Journal of Env. L. 141 (1994); Harold J. Krent & Ethan G. Shenkman, Of Citizen Suits and 
Citizen Sunstein, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 1793 (1993); Cass R Sunstein, What's Standing After Lu- 
jan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article III,91 Mich. L. Rev. 163 (1992); Note, Charles S. 
Abell, Ignoring the Trees for the Forest How the Citizens Suit Provision of the Clean Water 
Act Violates the Constitution's Separation of Powers Principle, 81 Va. L. Rev 1957 (1995); 
Comment, Christopher T. Bun, Mootness and Citizen Suit Civil Penalty Claims Under the 
Clean Water Act: A Post-Lujan Reassessment, 25 Envt'l L. 801 (1995); Comment, Procedural 
Injury Standing after Lujan v. Def& of WIdlife, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 275 (1995). 
2. 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
3. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387. 
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 have come to be known gen- 
erally as the "Clean Water Act," and will be referred to throughout this article as the Clean 
Water Act in text, and as "CWA" in footnotes. 
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Despite the 24 year history of the Clean Water Act, some basic 
standing questions remain unsettled: for example, can a citizen suit 
be brought to challenge an undisputed permit violation where 
there is no present or imminent perceptible effect on the receiving 
water body?4 Can a citizen suit be enforced against the violation of 
recordkeeping and reporting requirements imposed under the 
Clean Water Act, where violations of such requirements do not di- 
rectly result in additional pollution to the water body?5 Can a citi- 
zen suit be brought against a discharger who has failed to obtain a 
required permit even if the discharges would have been permissible 
with a These problems do not fit neatly into an Article I11 
rubric of "injury-in-fact," "causation," and "redressability." 
The underlying tension between the Clean Water Act's goals and 
strict application of Article I11 standing doctrine, together with the 
lack of clear guidance from the Supreme Court, has lead to the 
development of a wide spectrum of approaches to standing doc- 
trine in the lower federal courts in citizens enforcement actions 
under the Clean Water Act. The potential approaches range from 
a strict "causation in fact" test at one extreme to the tantalizing pos- 
sibility of universal citizen standing at the other. This article will 
examine the various approaches to the application of standing doc- 
trine to Clean Water Act citizen suits, and evaluate the consistency 
of each of these approaches with the legislative intent of Congress 
in adopting the Clean Water Act citizen suit provisions. The article 
will also consider the impact of the Supreme Court's decision in 
Lujan v. Def& of WiZdlVe upon the continued validity of the vari- 
ous approaches to Clean Water Act citizens enforcement suits. The 
article concludes that an approach to citizen suit standing that rec- 
ognizes the standing of any plaintiff with a genuine, ongoing recre- 
ational, aesthetic, or organizational interest in the receiving water 
body is most consistent with the Congressional intent behind the 
4. Compare Friends of Earth v. Crown Central Petroleum Corp.; U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16338 
(E.D.  ex 1995) (standing denied because plaintiffs could point to no imminent injury to 
wildlife caused by defendant's discharge) with Friends of Earth v. Chevron Chem. Co., 900 F. 
Supp. 67 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (standing upheld even though defendant's conmbution was less 
than .17% of flow to lake); cf: Public Interest Research Group of N.J. v. Magnesium Elektron, 
Inc., U.S. App. LEXIS 20846 (3d Cir. 1997) (vacating judgment in favor of plaintiffs on 
grounds that-plaintiffs had failed to prove actual impact of violations on receiving water 
body). 
5. P.Z.RG. v. Yak Induct. Znc., 757 F. Supp. 438, 443 (D.N.J. 1991). 
6. CJ Siem Club v. Cedar Point Oil Corp., 73 F.3d 546 (5th Cu. 1996) (rejecting defend- 
ant's argument that a citizens' suit was unavailable where same discharges would have been 
permitted under EPA permit guidelines, but affh+ng denial of injunctive relief). 
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Clean Water Act and is consistent with the Supreme Court's recog- 
nition of "procedural" standing in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife. 
First, this article will review the impetus and purposes for the 
Clean Water Act of 1972, including its citizen suit provision, partic- 
ularly as these purposes relate to the elimination of specific harm 
or causation requirements in enforcement actions under its provi- 
sions. Second, this article will briefly review the basic elements of 
Article I11 standing requirements as enunciated by the Supreme 
Court, and the development of Supreme Court standing doctrine 
in environmental cases leading up to and including the Defenders of 
Wildlife decision. Then the article will survey the various ap- 
proaches courts have taken in applying Article I11 standing doctrine 
to Clean Water Act citizens enforcement suits. Finally, this article 
will consider the effect of the Def&s of Wildlife decision and other 
Supreme Court standing doctrine on citizens enforcement standing 
under the Clean Water Act. This review concludes that Supreme 
Court standing doctrine, including the Defhuh of Wildlife decision, 
supports a more inclusive approach to citizens suit standing than 
that currently prevailing in the courts. 
The federal Clean Water Act was enacted in 1972 in response to 
the worsening pollution of the nation's waterways and dissatisfac- 
tion with the failure of its predecessor, the Water Quality Act,' to 
provide effective controls on water pollution. The Clean Water Act 
declared ambitious goals to make all of the nation's waters fishable 
and swimmable by 1983, and to eliminate all pollutant discharges to 
water by 1985: 
The objective of this chapter is to restore and maintain the chem- 
ical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters. In 
order to achieve this objective it is hereby declared that, consis- 
tent with the provisions of this chapter 
(1) it is the national goal that the discharge of pollutants into 
the navigable waters be eliminated by 1985; 
(2) it is the national goal that wherever attainable, an interim 
goal of water quality which provides for the protection and 
propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife, and provides for 
recreation in and on the water be achieved by July 1, 
1983. . . 
7. Pub. L. No. 84234, 79 Stat 903. 
8. CWA 5 101(a), 33 U.S.C. 5 1251(a)(1994). 
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The Clean Water Act was adopted out of frustration with the fail- 
ure of the preexisting federal Water Quality Act to control water 
pol l~t ion.~ Under the Water Quality Act, pollution was prohibited 
only to the extent that it caused a violation of water quality stan- 
dards in the receiving water bodies.10 These standards were estab- 
lished by state water quality control boards. The scientific 
uncertainty of tracing specific environmental impacts to particular 
concentrations of pollutant discharges made these standards difi- 
cult to establish and even more difficult to enforce. Enforcement 
of this prohibition was extremely problematic, as it was nearly im- 
possible to prove, in any case, that a violation of water quality stan- 
dards was caused by any one given polluter. Thus, each individual 
source of water pollution could point its finger at other sources of 
pollution to the same water body and say that the water body would 
violate standards even if its own pollution was eliminated. 
More fundamentally, the Water Quality Act assumed that the a p  
propriate method of treating water pollution was simply to allow 
dilution by the receiving water body, as long as that body had assim- 
ilative capacity remaining. The Senate Report on the Clean Water 
Act noted the defects in this approach: 
[Blecause of the great difficulty associated with establishing relia- 
ble and enforceable precise eMuent limitations on the basis of a 
given stream quality, water quality standards, in addition to their 
deficiencies in relying on the assimilative capacity of receiving 
waters, often cannot be translated into effluent limitations-de- 
pendable in court tests, because of the imprecision of models for 
water quality and the effects of effluents in most waters." 
Due to these difficulties, the Water Quality Act was, as a practical 
matter, unenforceable and ineffective. During the Senate debate 
on the Clean Water Act, Senator Muskie noted that in over two de- 
cades under the prior enforcement regime, only one enforcement 
case reached the courts, and that case itself took four years to prose- 
9. Seegmmally Mark C. Van Putten & Bradley D. Jackson, The Dilution of the Clmn Water Act, 
19 U. Mich. J. Law. Ref. 863 (Summer, 1986); Frank P. Grad, Environmental Law $5 3.03[1] - 
[2] (a-1) (1995). 
10. Id 
11. S. Rep. No. 92-414 (1972), @tinted in 1972 U.S.C.Ci4.N. 3668 and in 92d Cong. 2d 
Sess. (1972) at 8, reprinted in Environmental Policy Div., Congressional Research Sew., Li- 
brary of Congress, 93d Cong. 1st Sess., A Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control 
Act Amendments of 1972 at 1426 (Comm. Print 1973) (hereinafter cited as 1972 Legislative 
History). 
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cute from the initial enforcement conference required under the 
Water Quality Act to the consent decree.12 
The 1972 Clean Water Act sought to correct these philosophical 
and practical defects in the previous water pollution control re- 
gime. Philosophically, Congress adopted the principle that "no one 
has the right to pollute - that pollution continues because of tech- 
nological limits, not because of any inherent right to use the na- 
tion's waterways for the purpose of disposing of wastes.*13 In order 
to implement this principle practically, the Congress adopted a 
blanket prohibition on all discharges of pollutants, whether or not 
the discharge caused any demonstrable impact to the receiving 
water body, except and unless the discharge was authorized by (and 
in compliance with) a permit issued in accordance with its 
provisions. 
In order to implement the principle that pollution continues only 
to the extent that existing technology makes its control infeasible, 
the Clean Water Act establishes a system of permits that impose 
technology-based effluent limitations.14 These effluent limitations 
are based on available control technologies for various classes and 
types of pollutant discharges, and for various industrial processes. 
In addition, a system of water quality-based effluent limitations was 
retained, so that any particular discharger is required to comply 
with the more stringent of the two requirements - water quality- 
based or technology-based.15 
The intent of this fundamental change in the approach to regula- 
tion of pollutant discharges into the nation's waters was to redefine 
enforceable water pollution restrictions without reference to mea- 
surable impacts on the ecology of the receiving water body. Con- 
gress sought, at the same time, to enhance enforcement of the 
newly implemented pollutant discharge regulatory regime. Unlike 
the Water Quality Act, the provisions of the Clean Water Act were 
to be enforceable directly by the federal government in all circurn- 
12. 117 Cong. Rec. 38799, reprinted in 1972 Legislative History, supra note 12, at 1257. 
13. 1972 Senate Report at 42, reprinted in 1972 Legislative History, supra note 12, at 1425. 
14. CWA 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (establishing effluent standards based on best available 
technology), 304, 33 U.S.C. § 1314 (requiring EPA to establish technology-based effluent 
standards), 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (providing for permitting scheme for discharges requiring 
compliance with effluent standards provided in §§ 301.33 U.S.C. § 1311, and 304,33 U.S.C. 
§ 1314)(1994). 
15. See CWA 302(a), 33 U.S.C. 1312(a)(1994). 
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stances.16 And, like the then recently enacted Clean Air Act, the 
Clean Water Act provided for citizens enforcement of its prohibi- 
tions against unpermitted discharges of pollutants: 
. . . any citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf - 
(1) against any person . . . who is alleged to be in violation of 
(A) an effluent standard or limitation under this chapter or 
(B) an order issued by the Administrator or the State with 
respect to such standard or limitation . . . .I7 
The "effluent standard [s] or limitation [s] " that may be enforced 
by citizens are broadly defined to include any violation of the gen- 
eral prohibition against unpermitted discharge of pollutants, as 
well as the violation of any permit or condition of a permit issued 
under the Clean Water Act.18 
More importantly, for the purpose of standing analysis, "citizen" 
was defined, for, citizens enforcement purposes, to include "a per- 
son or persons having an interest which is or may be adversely af- 
fected."lg This provision was intended to grant standing to the 
limits permitted by the Constitution, as stated in the Supreme 
Court's decision in Sierra Club v. Morton.20 The Conference Com- 
mittee report made this intention explicit: "the understanding of 
the conferees [is] that the conference substitute relating to the def- 
inition of the term 'citizen' reflects the decision of the U.S. 
Supreme Court in the case of Sierra Club v. M ~ r t o n . " ~ ~  During the 
Senate Debate on the conference bill, Senator Muskie explained 
this language as follows: 
In the Sierra Club case, the Supreme Court was asked to inter- 
pret section 10 of the Administrative Procedures Act - 5 U.S.C. 
section 702 - which contains wording similar to that of section 
505(g) of the conference bill. The Supreme Court emphasized 
that "the interest alleged to have been injured may reflect aes- 
thetic conservational and recreational as well as economic values 
1, 
. . .  
16. CWA 5 309.33 U.S.C. 5 1319 (1994). The Water Quality Act permitted enforcement 
by the federal government only where water quality of interstate waters fell below established 
standards, pollutant discharges in one state endangered health or welfare in another state, or 
where the governor of the state of discharge consented to the enforcement action. 33 U.S.C. 
5 466g(c)(5), (d)(l) ,  (g) (Supp. I 1965); =Van Putten &Jackson, supra n.lO, at 873 n.41. 
17. CWA 5 505(a), 33 U.S.C. 5 1365(a)(1994). 
18. CWA § 505(f), 33 U.S.C. 3 1365(0(1994). 
19. CWA 5 505(g), 33 U.S.C. 5 1365(g)(1994). 
20. 405 U.S. 727 (1972). discussed infia, text accompanying nn.2837. 
21. S. Conf. Rep. No. 92-1236 (1972). rrgnnted in 1972 U.S.C.CAN. 3776, 3823, and in 
1972 Legislative History, supra note 12, at 281, 329. 
Heinonline - -  22 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 175 1997 
Thus it is clear that the under the language agreed to by the con- 
ference, a noneconomic interest in the environment, in clean 
water, is a sufficient base for a citizen suit under section 505. 
Further, every citizen of the United States has a legitimate and 
established interest in the use and quality of the navigable waters of 
the United States. Thus, I would presume that a citizen of the 
United States, regardless of residence, would have an interest as de- 
fined in this bill regardless of the location of the waterway and re- 
gardless of the issue involved.22 
The history and context of the 1972 Clean Water Act make clear 
that Congress intended to substitute a regime of strict liability for 
discharges of pollution in violation of its provisions for the pre-ex- 
isting regime where proof of actual injury to a water body was re- 
quired in order to establish a violation. At the same time, Congress 
clearly intended this regime to be enforceable by those citizens who 
used and enjoyed the affected water body aesthetically, recreation- 
ally, or for environmental well being. Courts have been struggling 
since that time with the question whether the "injury-in-fact" re- 
quirement of Article I11 standing requires precisely the kind of 
proof of actual impact on water quality, traceable to the dis- 
charger's own pollution, that Congress meant to eliminate in enact- 
ing the Clean Water Act. To understand the context of the 
development of Clean Water Act citizens enforcement standing law, 
a brief review of standing doctrine generally, and the Supreme 
Court's pronouncements .on environmental standing in particular, 
is appropriate. 
Modem standing doctrine evolved in this century as an aspect of 
the justiciability of cases in the federal courts created by Article I11 
of the United States Constitution. While other aspects of jus- 
ticiability, such as mootness, ripeness, and the political question 
doctrine addressed the issue of what claims could be heard in fed- 
eral court, standing doctrine addressed the question of who was en- 
titled to bring a case or controversy to federal court.23 Early cases 
22. Senate Consideration of the Report of The Conference Committee (Oct.4, 1972), 
1972 Legislative History, supra n.12, at 221. 
23. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83,99 (1969) ("The fundamental aspect of standing is that 
it focuses on the party . . . and not on the issues he wishes to have adjudicated. [Tlhe 
question . . . is whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper party to request 
an adjudication of a particular issue and not whether the issue itself is justiciable.") 
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addressed this issue in the context of suits by citizens and taxpayers 
who sought to challenge the constitutionality of Congressional en- 
actments. As the doctrine developed, the Court broadened its a p  
plication to include suits challenging agency action, and articulated 
constitutionally required minima for standing as well as non-consti- 
tutional "prudential" limitations. 
~ l though standing doctrine has generally been articulated as an 
aspect of the Article I11 Section 2 grant of the judicial power to hear 
"cases" and "controversies," the Court has also articulated a separa- 
tion of powers concern throughout its discussion of standing. 
Under the Court's Article I11 analysis of justiciability, the grant of 
authority to the courts to determine "cases" and "controversies" 
necessarily presupposes a notion that only parties with an appropri- 
ate interest in the issues presented for adjudication may seek the 
court's assistance; in the absence of such an interest, there may not 
be a genuine case for adjudication by the court, and the court is not 
assured of sufficient adversity and interest of the parties in thor- 
oughly presenting the issues to the court. In its separation of pow- 
ers incarnation, the standing requirement is seen as a check on the 
judicial system; a means of assuring that, by limiting the exercise of 
the judicial power to genuine individual controversy brought by 
parties with an individual interest in the subject matter, the exercise 
of the judicial review function of the courts will not overpower the 
legislative and executive branches of government. 
The current "irreducible minimum" for standing was articulated 
by the Supreme Court in Val4  Forge Christian College v. Americans 
United for Separation of Church and State.24 In that case, the Court 
denied standing to an organization of taxpayers complaining that 
the @t of surplus United States government property to a Christian 
religious college violated the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment. The Court held that: 
[A] t an irreducible minimum, Art. I11 requires the party who in- 
vokes the court's authority to "show that he personally has suf- 
fered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the 
putatively illegal conduct of the defendant," Gladstone, Realtors v. 
Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979), and that the injury 
"fairly can be traced to the challenged action" and "is likely to be 
redressed by a favorable decision," Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Wel- 
fare Rights Olg., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 41 (1976). In this manner does 
Art. I11 limit the federal judicial power "to those disputes which 
24. 454 U.S. 464 (1982). 
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confine federal courts to a role consistent with a system of sepa- 
rated powers and which are traditionally thought to be capable of 
resolution through the judicial process." Flast v. Cohen, 392 
The Court went on to reject the notion of pure "citizenn stand- 
ing, holding that the injury to "taxpayers" or "citizens" of a putative 
violation of the establishment clause was too diffuse and non-partic- 
ularized to support the individualized injury-in-fact it found to be 
required by Article III.*6 
The Vallqr Fmge Court thus restated what has become the familiar 
three part test for Article I11 standing: injury-in-fact, causation, and 
redressability. This test requires first, that the plaintiff have suf- 
fered a discrete, particularized "injury-in-fact" not shared with all 
citizens generally. Second, the injury must be "fairly traceablen to 
the conduct complained of on the part of the defendant, that is, 
there must be some sort of causal relationship between the wrong 
alleged and the injury suffered. Third, the injury be "redressable" 
by a favorable decision by the court. 
While this test is relatively easy to state, it becomes relatively diffi- 
cult to apply, especially in the context of environmental standing. 
Environmental wrongs tend to injure large numbers of people, and 
might thus be characterized as "generalized grievances" by their 
very nature. Environmental wrongs may cause impacts and injuries 
that are not immediately perceptible or objectively quantifiable 
under a literal interpretation of the term "injury-in-fact." Causation 
in the tort law sense may be impossible to establish where the con- 
tributions of numerous, dispersed polluters combine to cause an 
environmental injury. Similarly, redressability may become prob- 
lematic where the elimination or limitation of just one source of 
pollution will not resolve the overall polluted condition of a partic- 
ular resource, or where adherence to a particular environmental 
review procedure may or may not result in a different decision 
about a proposed federal action with environmental consequences. 
Perhaps because of the difficulty posed by these issues, environ- 
mental standing cases have played an important role in the devel- 
opment of the Supreme Court application of standing doctrine. As 
will be seen, the Supreme Court has, at least until the Defenden of 
Wildlife decision, accommodated standing doctrine to address the 
problems of standing in environmental litigation. 
25. Id. at 472. 
26. Id. at 465. 
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The United States Supreme Court has addressed environmental 
standing in six cases since 1970, from the Sierra Club v. Morton case 
in 1970 through Lujan v. D e f h  of WiIdliJe in 1992.27 Throughout 
this line of cases run certain common threads: while the Court has 
not required a high threshold showing of environmental injury to 
satisfy the "injury-in-factn requirement, and has explicitly recog- 
nized non-traditional injuries such as harm to aesthetic interests as 
sufficient, the Court has strictly required that the putative litigant 
demonstrate some physical or geographically proximate relation- 
ship with the resource affected. The Court has been markedly un- 
friendly to litigants who express an abstract interest in 
environmental ideas and ideals unless this interest is physically 
anchored to some tangible resource. The Court has also not re- 
quired a strict showing of tort-style causation to satisfy the "fairly 
traceable" and "redressability* requirements. 
A. Environmental InjuryIn--Fact: The Morton Test Recognizing 
Nontraditional Harm 
The Supreme Court first addressed environmental standing in Si- 
erra Club v. Morton, a case that is probably more significant for its 
dicta and for Justice Douglas' memorable dissent than for its hold- 
ing. In Morton, the Court rejected the Sierra Club's standing under 
the Administrative Procedure Act to challenge a series of approvals 
for development of a ski resort on federal lands in the Mineral King 
area of the Sierra Nevada mountains. Sierra Club had sought to 
rely solely on its organizational interest in national environmental 
issues and wilderness preservation generally to assert standing, and 
specifically disavowed reliance on the interests of any of its mem- 
bers who camped, hiked, or skiied in the area to be affected by the 
development.28 The Court, in an opinion written by Justice Stew- 
art, emphatically rejected the notion that "a mere 'interest in a 
27. The cases are: Sierra Club v. M d o n ,  supra, United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973) 
supra note 3; Duke Power Co., v. Carolina Envt'l Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978); Japan 
Whaling v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986); Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 
497 U.S. 871 (1990) (statutoly standing); and Lujan v. Defadm of WiIdlzP, supra note 3. 
28. Morton, 405 U.S. at 736. The Sierra Club did, however, plead that "[olne of the princi- 
pal purposes of the Sierra Club is to protect and conserve the national resources of thesierra 
Nevada Mountains." 405 U.S. at 739 n.8. 
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problem,' no matter how longstanding the interest and no matter 
how qualified the organization is in evaluating the problem" would 
be sufficient to establish the requisite injury or "aggrievement," at 
least under the Administrative Procedures Act.29 
While rejecting the abstract interest in environmental issues as a 
basis of standing, however, the Court made equally clear that it 
would recognize environmental standing even in the absence of in- 
jury to traditional legal interests, and even where the environmen- 
tal injury was widely shared. The Court specifically recognized 
aesthetic interests and "environmental well-being" as constihltion- 
ally cognizable interests: 
[TI he complaint alleged that the development "would destroy or 
otherwise adversely affect the scenery, natural and historic ob- 
jects and wildlife of the park and would impair the enjoyment of 
the park for future generations." We do not question that this 
type of harm may amount to an "injury in fact" sufficient to lay 
the basis for standing under 5 10 of the APA. Aesthetic and envi- 
ronmental well-being, like economic well-being, are important 
ingredients of the quality of life in our society, and the fact that 
particular environmental interests are shared by the many rather 
than the few does not make them less deserving of legal protec- 
tion through the judicial process.s0 
Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court then went on to note with 
approval the judicial trend "toward discarding the notion that an 
injury that is widely shared is ips0 facto not an injury sufficient to 
provide the basis for judicial review."sl 
Justice Douglas' dissent suggested that the Court should recog- 
nize standing to sue in the name of the environmental resource 
Noting that the courts had traditionally recognized the 
standing of abstract entities and inanimate objects to sue in their 
own name, in the form of corporate parties and vessels, Douglas 
reasoned that environmental resources should themselves have 
standing: 
So it should be as respects valleys, alpine meadows, rivers, lakes, 
estuaries, beaches, ridges, groves of trees, swampland, or even air 
that feels the destructive pressures of modem technology and 
modem life. The river for example, is the living symbol of all the 
29. Id. at 735. 
30. Id at 734. 
31. Id. at 738. 
32. For a recent decision recognizing the standing of an endangered species to sue in its 
own name, see Loggerhead Turtle v. The County Council of Volusia County, Florida, 896 F. 
Supp. 1170 (M.D. Fla. 1995). 
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life it sustains or nourishes - fish, aquatic insects, water ouzels, 
otter, fisher, deer, elk, bear, and all other animals, including 
man, who are dependent on it or who enjoy it for its sight, its 
sound, or its life. The river as plaintiff speaks for the ecological 
unit of life that is part of it. Those people who have a meaningful 
relation to that bodv of water - whether it be a fisherman, a 
canoeist, a zoologist, or a logger - must be able to speak for the 
values which the river represents and which are threatened with 
destr~ction.~~ 
Justice Douglas then pointed out that the Sierra Club's uncon- 
tested allegation that "one of the principal purposes of the Sierra 
Club is to protect and conserve the national resources of the Sierra 
Nevada mountainsn was found by the District Court to be a suffi- 
cient basis of standing.34 Justices Blackrnun and Brennan also 
d i s ~ e n t e d . ~ ~  
Justice Stewart's majority opinion and Justice Douglas' dissent 
may not be that far apart philosophically. Like the majority, Justice 
Douglas would require a "meaningful relationn between the individ- 
uals seeking to sue and the environmental resource they sought to 
represent. Justice Douglas did not elaborate on why he felt that the 
Sierra Club met this "meaningful relation" test in the Mineral King 
case, but seemed to share with the majority the view that "[tlhose 
who hike it, fish it, hunt it, camp in it, frequent it, or visit it merely 
to sit in wonderment are legitimate spokesmen for [an environmen- 
tal resource], whether they may be few or many.ns6 
Despite the Justices' disagreement on the ultimate disposition of 
the Mineral King standing question, the Sierra Club Court seemed to 
resolve, at least initially, some of the tough issues of environmental 
standing. The majority and dissent agreed that environmental inju- 
ries shared in common, and injuries to intangible interests such as 
33. Mo7ton, 405 U.S. at 743. 
34. Id. at 744. Justice Douglas does not elaborate whether he, too, found this allegation 
sufficient to establish the requisite "meaningful relation" between the putative plaintiff and 
the resource to be protected. Although it quotes this allegation, Justice Stewart's majority 
opinion also does not address whether this corporate interest in the presenation of the Si- 
erra Nevada mountains might be sufficient to establish the Sierra Club's standing in its own 
right 
35. Molton, 405 U.S. at 755-60. Justice Blackmun would have either remanded the case to 
the District Court with instructions to permit Sierra Club to modify its pleading to assert the 
individual interests of its members in using the Mineral King area, or would have expanded 
standing doctrine to acknowledge the standing of sufficiently dedicated environmental 
organizations. 
36. Mortm, 405 U.S. at 744-45; I$ Morton ("Nowhere in the pleadings or the affidavits did 
the Club state that its members use Mineral King for any purpose . . . ."), at 735. 
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aesthetic values and "environmental well-being" would suffice to es- 
tablish injury-in-fact for standing purposes. Majority and dissent 
also both seemed to agree that the standing of individuals seeking 
to assert the protection of environmental resources would depend 
on the existence of some sort of "meaningful relation" between the 
plaintiff (or its members) and the resource affected. 
Subsequent decisions of the Court would confirm the M d o n  
Court's dicta recognizing harms to "environmental well-beingn and 
aesthetic enjoyment of environmental resources as constitutional 
"injury-in-fact." In United States v. S t u h t s  Chahging Regulatoly 
Agency Procedure97 (SCRAP) the Court affirmed a holding that an 
environmental organization had standing based on its members' al- 
legations that they "use[d] the forests, rivers, streams, mountains, 
and other natural resources surrounding the Washington Metro- 
politan area [for] . . . camping, hiking, fishing, sightseeing, and 
other recreational [and] aesthetic purposes" and a claim that the 
rail freight rate increases it sought challenging would reduce re- 
cycling, increase litter, and increase consumption of natural 
resources.S8 
Perhaps more significantly (at least as far as environmental injury 
is concerned), in Duke Power Company v. Carolina Envimnmental Study 
Cmup, I ~ C . , ~ ~  the Court upheld a finding of constitutional standing 
for a group of residents living in close proximity to planned nuclear 
generating facilities to challenge the Price Anderson Act.* The 
plaintiffs had claimed that nuclear generating facilities would cause 
various environmental and economic impacts, including: 
(a) the production of small quantities of non-natural radiation 
which would invade the air and water; (b) a "sharp increase" in 
the temperature of two lakes presently used for recreational pur- 
poses resulting from the use of the lake waters to produce steam 
and to cool the reactor; (c) interference with the normal use of 
the waters of the Catawba River; (d) threatened reduction in 
property values of land neighboring the power plants; (e) "objec- 
tively reasonable" 'present fear and apprehension "regarding the 
effect of the increased radioactivity in air, land and water upon 
[appellees] and their property, and the genetic effects upon 
their descendants"; and (f)  the continual threat of "an accident 
37. 412 U.S. 669 (1973). 
38. Id. at 678. 
39. 438 U.S. 59 (1978). 
40. 71 Stat 576, 42 U.S.C. 5 2210. The Price Anderson Act limited liability of nuclear 
power facilities. Id. Plaintiffs in the Duke Pwer  case challenged this liability limitation on 
constitutional due process and equal protection grounds. 
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resulting in uncontrolled release of large or even small quantities 
of radioactive material" with no assurance of adequate compensa- 
tion for the resultant 
The Court upheld this finding of sufficient "injury-in-fact," specifi- 
cally relying on thermal pollution of the lakes and exposure to non- 
natural radiation: 
It is enough that several of the "immediate" adverse effects were 
found to harm appellees. Certainly the environmental and aes- 
thetic consequences of the thermal pollution of the two lakes in 
the vicinity of the disputed power plants is the type of harmful 
effect which has been deemed adequate in prior cases to satisfy 
the "injury in fact" standard. See United States v. SCRAP, supra. Cf: 
Sierra Club v. Mmton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972). And the emission 
of non-natural radiation into appellees' environment would also 
seem a direct and present injury, given our generalized concern 
about exposure to radiation and the apprehension flowing from 
the uncertainty about the health and genetic consequences of 
even small emissions like those concededly emitted by nuclear 
power plants.42 
The Duke Power Court's reliance on "exposure to non-natural ra- 
diation" and the effects of thermal pollution on lakes is telling. The 
Court did not require the plaintiffs to prove, even as a matter of 
scientific possibility, that the levels of "non-natural" radiation they 
would be exposed to would cause any increased risk of illness to 
them; it was sufficient that the exposure was "non-natural" and was 
a matter of scientific uncertainty. The Duke Court also did not re- 
quire that the injury claimed by the plaintiffs be the same as that 
addressed by their substantive claim; after all, the Duke Power plain- 
tiffs were asserting an essentially economic substantive claim (depri- 
vation of the right to recover full compensation for injuries in the 
event of a nuclear accident), not a claim for environmental protec- 
ti0n.~3 In addition, the' Duke Power standing holding was based on 
four days of factual hearings on the standing issue,44 so, unlike Mor- 
ton and SCRAP, the standing issue in Duke Powerwas presented on a 
fully developed factual record and not at the pleading stage. 
41. Duke Power Company, 438 U.S. at 73 (quoting district court opinion, 431 F. Supp. 203, 
209 (W.D.N.C. 1977). 
42. Id. at 7374. 
43. Id. at 68. Indeed, the lhke  Power Court specifically rejected the assertion that plaintiffs 
be required to establish the "nexus" between the injury claimed and the constitutional provi- 
sion allegedly violated as was required of those asserting taxpayer standing. Id. at 78-81; see 
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). 
44. Duke Pown; 438 U.S. at 72. 
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Two other Supreme Court decisions, although not directly bear- 
ing on Article I11 standing, warrant mention. The Supreme Court 
again upheld environmental standing in Japan Whaling Association v. 
Ama'can Cetacean Society,45 where the Court stated, in a footnote, 
that an organization whose members engaged in whale watching 
and the study of whales had alleged a sufficient "injury-in-fact" to 
challenge the Secretary of Commerce's failure to sanction Japan for 
violating the ~nternationb Whaling Commission quotas." Then in 
1990, in Lujan v. National Wildlife Federati~n,~~ the Supreme Court 
issued its first ruling since Mmton denying environmental standing, 
although it did so as a matter of statutory standing under the Ad- 
ministrative Procedure Act rather than as a matter of constitutional 
standing under Article 111. 
In National Wildlife Federation, the Court found that the National 
Wildlife Federation had failed adequately to allege that its members 
were "among those injured" where the affidavits submitted in s u p  
port of standing established only that its members used small por- 
tions of vast areas opened up for mineral development by 
challenged "withdrawal" determinations by the United States Forest 
Service.4* The plaintiff asserted that its members used federal lands 
for recreation "in the vicinity of" the National Forest lands that had 
been opened to mineral development, but failed to assert that the 
individual members actually used any portion of the lands actually 
opened for development within the vast national forest areas identi- 
fied (2.5 million acres and 5.5 million acres).49 According to the 
Court, the NWF plaintiffs had failed to show that they used the ac- 
tual environmental resources that would be affected by the chal- 
lenged determination, and thus failed to establish that their 
asserted injuries fell within the "zone of interests" protected by the 
statute, as required for a judicial review action under the Adminis- 
trative Procedure Act.50 
Thus, the NWF plaintiffs, like the Sierra Club in S h a  Club v. 
Morton, had failed to show that they were themselves "among those 
injured by the challenged action. This line of Supreme Court 
cases dealing with standing "injury" can be broken down into two 
45. 478 U.S. 221 (1986). 
46. Id. at 286 n.4. 
47. 497 U.S. 871 (1990). 
48. Id. at 886-887. 
49. Id. at 885-887. 
50. Id. at 882483, 888. 
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threads - the first dealing with the kinds (and degree) of environ- 
mental injuries that the Court will recognize as sufficient to confer 
Article I11 (or statutory) standing, and the second dealing with the 
relationship between the putative plaintiff and the resource af- 
fected. The Supreme Court has been quite willing to recognize 
non-traditional injuries, such as injury to aesthetic or recreational 
interests, and even uncertain injuries, such as the exposure to un- 
natural radiation in Duke Power. The Court has, however, strictly 
required the putative plaintiff to establish its "meaningfid relation- 
ship" to the environmental resource affected, and has insisted that 
this relationship be concrete, and not abstract. Thus, an abstract 
interest in an environmental issue has uniformly been rejected, as 
have interests in vast regions without identification of the use of the 
specific area affected by the decision challenged. 
B. Causation and Redressability: SCRAP and Duke Power. 
The causation and redressability elements of standing are re- 
lated. Establishment of the causal relationship between the con- 
duct complained of and the constitutional injury complained of will 
often subsume the determination of whether a Court order en- 
joining such conduct will provide relief to the plaintiff. The Court 
has not, however, at least up to the Def& of Wildlife decision, 
required a showing of strict tort causation in the sense that the 
complained of conduct be the but-for cause of the plaintiffs harm. 
To the contrary, the Court has been willing to accept quite attenu- 
ated theories of causation, at least at the pleading stage. 
Thus, in SCRAP, the Court accepted plaintiffs' allegation that the 
challenged increase in freight rates would increase the cost of trans- 
porting recycled materials, thus discouraging recycling, leading to 
increased consumption of raw materials as well as increased litter.51 
Plaintif& alleged that some of this increased littering, as well as 
some of the increase in logging and mineral development, would 
occur in national parks and forests in the Washington, D.C. area, 
interfering with plaintiffs' members' enjoyment of those re- 
source~.~* Plaintiffs also alleged that the increased use and process- 
ing of raw materials would increase pollution of the air breathed by 
their members.5S While noting that pleading of causation must be 
51. SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 68889. 
52. Id. at 678, 688. 
53. Id. at 678. 
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more than an "ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable," the 
Court determined that plaintiffs had adequately pleaded specific 
harms to their members flowing from the rate increase.S4 Signifi- 
cantly, the Court also acknowledged that what suffices at the plead- 
ing stage would not necessarily suffice for summary judgment: "If, 
as the railroads now assert, these allegations were in fact untrue, 
then the appellants should have moved for summary judgment on 
the standing issue and demonstrated to the District Court that the 
allegations were sham and raised no genuine issue of fa~t . "5~ 
The Court also accepted a relatively attenuated standing theory 
in Duh Power c0.5~ There, plaintiffs claimed, and the District Court 
had found, that without the liability limitations of the Price-hder- 
son Act, nuclear power plants could not economically be con- 
structed in plaintiffs' locality, and plaintiffs would be spared the 
environmental impacts of local nuclear power plants.57 The Court 
found sufficient support for this finding in the testimony of plain- 
tiffs' experts, as well as the testimony presented by nuclear industry 
proponents during hearings on the Price-Anderson The 
Court also rejected the defendants' claim that plaintiffs be required 
to disprove the possibility that, even in the absence of Price-hder- 
son, nuclear power plants would have been constructed by the fed- 
eral government instead of private industry.59 
IV. SUPREME COURT CONSIDERATION F CLEAN WATER ACT 
CITIZEN SUIT STANDING. 
Although the United States Supreme Court has never directly 
confronted the question of citizen suit standing to enforce require- 
ments of the Clean Water Act, dicta in two Supreme Court decisions 
shed light on some of the Court's assumptions about the applica- 
tion of Article I11 requirements to citizens enforcement suit cases. 
In the first case, Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea 
CZummers,* the Court appears to reject the possibility of universal 
citizens enforcement standing, while in the second case, Gwaltnq, of 
54. Id. at 688. 
55. Id. at 689. 
56. S u m  n.40. 
57. Id. 438 U.S. at 7478. 
58. Id. at 7577. 
59. Id. at 77-78. 
60. 453 U.S. 1 (1981). 
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Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay F~undation,~' the Court seems to assume 
that violation of a Clean Water Act is itself the injury-in-fact that 
supports standing. These decisions are discussed below. 
A. National Sea Clammers 
In National Sea Clammers, a coalition of commercial fisherman 
sued the Middlesex County Sewerage Authority and other polluters 
seeking damages for injuries to their economic interests resulting 
from pollution of water in violation of federal law (including, inter 
alia, the Clean Water The plaintiffs asserted claims under 
an implied private right of action under the Clean Water Act.63 
The Third Circuit had held that the fishermen plaintiffs were enti- 
tled to seek such damages and that an implied private right of ac- 
tion was neither preempted by nor inconsistent with the citizen suit 
provisions of the Clean Water 
In reaching this conclusion, the Third Circuit reasoned that the 
Clean Water Act citizen suit provision did not preclude a private 
right of action because the citizen suit provision provided an ex- 
plicit remedy for those potential plaintiffs who had not suffered any 
compensable injury that would give rise to a cause of action.65 
Thus, the citizen suit provision, according to the Third Circuit, was 
meant for those plaintiffs who had not suffered injury from the pol- 
lution, while those who had suffered injury could still pursue com- 
mon law remedies and an implied right of action.66 
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there is no private 
right of action for damages under the Clean Water Act. In doing 
so, it explicitly rejected the Third Circuit's conclusion that the citi- 
zen suit provisions were meant for plaintiffs who had not suffered 
any injury: 
In fact, it is clear that the citizen-suit provisions apply only to per- 
sons who can claim some sort of injuly and there is, therefore, no 
reason to infer the existence of a separate right of action for "in- 
jured plaintiffs. "Citizen" is defined in the citizensuit section of 
the FWPCA as "a person or persons having an interest which is or 
may be adversely affected." § 505(g), 33 U.S.C. $j 1365(g). It is 
clear from the Senate Conference Report that this phrase was 
61. 484 U.S. 49 (1987). 
62. Nat'l Sea Clummers, 453 U.S. at 4 5  & n.6. 
63. Id. at 12. 
64. Id. at 9. 
65. Nat'l Sea Clummers h ' n  v. City @New York, 616 F.2d 1222, 1227 (3d Cir. 1980). 
66. Id. 
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intended by Congress to allow suits by all persons possessing 
standing under this Court's decision in Sierra Club v. Mmton, 405 
U.S. 727,92 S.Ct. 1361,31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972). See S. Conf. Rep. 
No. 92-1236, p. 146 (1972). This broad category of potential 
plaintiffs necessarily includes both plaintiffs seeking to enforce 
these statutes as private attorneys general, whose injuries are 
"noneconomic" and probably noncompensable, and persons 
like respondents who assert that they have suffered tangible eco- 
nomic injuries because of statutory  violation^.^^ 
B. Gwaltnq of Smithjield 
In Gwaltnq, the Court addressed primarily the statutory interpre- 
tation question of whether a citizen-plaintiff could bring a Clean 
Water Act suit for wholly past violations of the Act. The Court held 
that citizens could not so enforce the Act for past  violation^.^^ I t  
read the use of the present tense in the statutory provision that suit 
may be commenced against any person "who is alleged to be in 
violation of an  effluent standard o r  l i m i t a t i ~ n " ~ ~  to require a good 
faith allegation of ongoing violations at  the time suit is com- 
menced.'O It  stopped short, however, of requiring @of of ongoing 
violations as a jurisdictional matter.71 
In explaining this conclusion, the Court implied that ongoing vi- 
olations were also necessary to establish standing, and that failure 
to prove an ongoing violation at summary judgment o r  trial would 
defeat citizen suit standing: 
Petitioner contends that failure to require proof of allegations 
under !j 505 would permit plaintiffs whose allegations of ongoing 
violation are reasonable but untrue to maintain suit in federal 
court even though they lack constitutional standing. Petitioner 
reasons that if a defendant is in complete compliance with the 
Act at the time of suit, plaintiffs have suffered no injury remedia- 
ble by the citizens suit provisions of the Act. Petitioner, however, 
fails to recognize that our standing cases uniformly recognize 
that allegations of injury are sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction 
of a court. . . . This is not to say, however, that such allegations 
may not be challenged. In United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 
689 (1973), we noted that if the plaintiffs "allegations [of stand- 
ing] were in fact untrue, the [defendants] should have moved for 
summary judgment on the standing issue and demonstrated to 
67. Nut? Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 1617. 
68. Gwaknq,, 484 U.S. at 56-63. 
69. CWA § 505(a) (1). 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1) (1994). 
70. Gwaknq,, 484 U.S. at 56-60. 
71. Id. at 6467. 
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the District Court that the allegations were sham and raised no 
genuine issue of fact." If the defendant fails to make such a 
showing after the plaintiff offers evidence to support the allega- 
tion, the case proceeds to trial on the merits, where the plaintiff 
must prove the allegations in order to prevail.72 
Justice Scalia's concurring opinion (joined by Justices O'Connor 
and Stevens), made the point more explicitly: in the view of these 
Justices, there could be no injury-in-fact once the violation of the 
Clean Water Act had ceased: 
If it is undisputed that the defendant was in a state of compliance 
when this suit was filed, the plaintiffs would have been suffering 
no remediable injury-in-fact that could support suit. The consti- 
tutional requirement for such injury is reflected in the statute 
itself, which defines "citizen" as one who has "an interest which is 
or may be adversely affe~ted."'~ 
This assumption that an ongoing violation is the essence of in- 
jury-in-fact for standing purposes in a Clean Water Act citizen suit 
may ultimately have great significance, for it presumes that the stat- 
utory violation is itself the "injury" that justifies court intervention, 
and not the demonstrable consequences of the violation to the re- 
ceiving water body. Clearly, the impacts of water pollution do not 
subside immediately upon the elimination of the source - toxic 
levels of pollutants, emissions of heavy metals, and biological oxy- 
gen demand may continue to destroy habitat, kill fish, or render 
fish unsuitable for fishing or eating for months, years, or even de- 
cades after the discharge of pollution has ceased.74 If, as Justice 
Scalia maintains, "injuryn exists only as long as the violation contin- 
ues, then the violation itself must be the presumptive injury, and 
not its scientifically uncertain consequences to the water body. 
It was against this backdrop of generally receptive environmental 
standing decisions that the Supreme Court decided the Lujan v. 
72. Id. at 65-66. 
73. Id. at 70. 
74. Consider the impact of PCB discharges by General Electric on the Hudson River. 
Although these discharges largely ceased by 1976, commercial fishing of most fish in the 
Hudson River is still banned, and health advisories for recreationally fished Hudson River 
fish are still in effect due largely to General Electric's emissions. If injury-in-fact consists of 
the demonstrable impacts of the statutory violations on concrete interests, then it is impossi- 
ble to understand how this injury-in-fact would be lacking for recreational and commercial 
users of Hudson River fish simply because General Electric stopped pouring more poisons 
into the river. 
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Defenders of Wildlife case in 1992. In Defhder-s of Wildlife, the Court 
reversed the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals' finding that the De- 
fenders of Wildlife had standing to protect endangered species lo- 
cated in foreign countries from habitat destruction caused by 
United States financed projects. 
Defenders of Wildlife had sued to challenge a change in Depart- 
ment of Interior regulations that removed the Endangered Species 
Act consultation r e q ~ i r e m e n t ~ ~  with respect to United States-fi- 
nanced projects on foreign soil.76 The District Court had granted 
summary judgment to the defendant, the Secretary of the Interior, 
on the grounds that Defenders of Wildlife lacked standing.77 The 
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, and would have found 
 tand ding.'^ 
Defenders of Wildlife asserted three standing theories. First, it 
relied on the individual standing of two of its members, one who 
had in the past visited the habitat of the endangered leopard and 
Asian elephant in Sri Lanka, and another who had in the past vis- 
ited the habitat of the endangered Nile crocodile in Egypt.79 Both 
of these habitats were threatened by United States Agency for Inter- 
national Development-financed projects.80 Both of these individu- 
als testified that they intended and hoped to return to these locales 
in the future and seek to view the endangered species in question, 
but neither had immediate plans to do so.81 
Second, Defenders of Wildlife relied on what it called the "ecosys- 
tem nexus approach" - the theory that its members who use any 
part of world ecosystem have a cognizable interest in the whole 
ecosystem, and suffer an injury when any part of that globally inter- 
woven system is injured.82 
Third, Defenders of Wildlife relied on what it called the "animal 
nexus approach" - that people interested in study of the endan- 
gered animals have a cognizable interest in protecting the species 
they are interested in worldwide, even if they have no plans to visit 
the habitat.83 Related to this theory, Defenders of Wildlife also re- 
75. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2)(1994). 
76. Defendm of Wldlzfe, 504 U.S. at 558559. 
77. Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 658 F. Supp. 43,4748 (D. Min.  1987). 
78. Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1035 (1988). 
79. Defendm of Wfi 504 U.S. at 563-564. 
80. Id. at 563-564. 
81. Id  
82. Id. at 565566. 
83. Id. at 566. 
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lied on its members whose interest in the species that were 
threatened was professional, rather than avocational, in nature.84 
In addition, Defenders of Wildlife relied on its own organiza- 
tional interest in the procedures guaranteed by the Endangered 
Species Act for the preservation of endangered species generally.B5 
In reversing the Eighth Circuit's finding of standing, the Court 
focused primarily on the same question presented by the Sierra Club 
v. Morton case: that is, whether the plaintiff had adequately demon- 
strated that it was itself among those injured by the conduct com- 
plained of by the defendant.86 Justice Scalia's sweeping opinion for 
the majority, however, contains much language that has caused 
concern for citizen enforcement plaintiffs, and that seems to pull 
back from the generally accommodating Supreme Court standing 
doctrine in environmental cases. 
The majority's broad language is tempered, somewhat, by the ex- 
ceptions Justice Scalia himself recognizes, implicitly and explicitly, 
to the strict "inju~y-in-fact" and "causation" requirements that he 
articulates. The holding is also tempered by the terms of the con- 
curring opinion written by Justice Kennedy and joined by Justice 
Souter, as well as by the dissenting opinion of Justice Marshall 
(joined by Justice O'Conner), and the concumng opinion of Jus- 
tice Stevens (who would have found standing but reversed on the 
merits). 
A. Justice Scalia's Majority Opinion on Injury-in-Imt 
The opinion for the Court rejected each of Defenders of Wild- 
life's standing theories. In doing so, Justice Scalia's majority opin- 
ion restated the "irreducible minimum" of constitutional standing 
in terms that, at least on their face, seemed to pull back from two 
decades of environmental standing doctrine.87 Justice Scalia easily 
rejected the standing claims of those of Defenders of Wildlife's 
members who expressed a hope to return at some indefinite time 
to the threatened habitats of the endangered species in question.88 
To the majority, the likelihood that these plaintiffs would in fact be 
exposed to the harms caused by the defendant's failure to consult 
concerning impacts of United States-funded projects in these far- 
84. Id. 
. 85. Id. at 571-572. 
86. Id. at 562-567. 
87. Id. at 560-61. 
88. Id. at 564. 
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flung areas was too remote and speculative to warrant adjudication 
of the merits of plaintiffs' claims.89 
On the facts presented, this holding is not startling, as the Article 
I11 sufficiency of the interest of individuals who had visited an envi- 
ronmental resource once in their lives and hoped someday to re- 
turn is at least a debatable proposition. Even Justice Douglas might 
question whether such individuals had established the "meaningful 
relationship" with the environmental resources in question as he 
would have required in his Sierra Club v. Mmton dissent. 
In reaching this conclusion, however, Justice Scalia's opinion re- 
states the standing requirements in terms more onerous to the envi- 
ronmental plaintiff than previous Supreme Court decisions. Thus, 
despite prior decisions that recognized standing for intangible in- 
terests, such as aesthetic values, and for environmental injuries 
which were widely shared by many members of the public, Justice 
Scalia's dictum requires that the claimed injury in fact be "concrete 
and particularized."g0 Similarly, in rejecting the "ecosystem nexus" 
theory of standing, Justice Scalia raised the ante for constitutional 
injury-in-fact. Instead of simply rejecting Defenders of Wildlife's 
claim that the entire world is one recognizable ecosystem giving any 
person with an interest in one part of the world ecosystem standing 
to sue with respect to any other portion of the world ecosystem, the 
Court phrased its holding in terms of the level of harm required to 
establish "injury-in-fact" : 
To say that the [Endangered Species] Act protects ecosystems is 
not to say that the Act creates (if it were possible) rights of action 
in persons who have not been injured in fact, that is, persons who 
use portions of an ecosystem not perceptibly affected by the un- 
lawful action in question.g1 
Justice Scalia thus reads a "perceptible [elffect" requirement into 
the concept of injury-in-fact. This "perceptibility" requirement a p  
pears to pull back substantially from such decisions as Duke Power 
Company, which recognized exposure to non-natural radiation as an 
injury-in-fact without requiring a showing that such exposure would 
cause a perceptible health effect in the plaintiffs. 
Similarly, the majority rejected the "animal nexus" and "voca- 
tional nexus" claims, finding a lack of perceptible harm to plaintiffs 
who had an interest in an animal species but could demonstrate no 
89. Id. 
90. Id. at 560. 
91. Id. at 566. 
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likely contact with the individuals of that species who might be 
harmed by the challenged government action.9* Citing Japan Whal- 
ing Association, Justice Scalia characterized as "the outermost limits 
of plausibility" a claim of perceptible harm by an individual inter- 
ested in study of a species in the same region of the world, in which 
that species is threatened by the government action challenged, as 
facing perceptible harm.gs 
As with the plaintiffs who only infrequently visited the area af- 
fected, rejection of standing for the "animal nexusn and "vocational 
nexusn plaintiffs does not represent that much of a departure from 
the Court's previous standing decisions. Right from the Sierra Club 
v. Morton case, the Court has been unsympathetic to standing based 
on claims of an interest or expertise in ideas or issues. Rejection of 
standing based on a vocational or avocational interest in the spe- 
cies, but not in the individual animals physically affected by the 
challenged conduct, is consistent with the Court's previous a p  
proach, which had emphasized the relationship between the plain- 
tiff and the physical resource affected. 
B. Justice Scalia 's Plurality Opinion Concerning Redressability 
In addition to finding insufficient injury-in-fact to support Article 
I11 standing, Justice Scalia would have rejected Defenders of Wild- 
life's claims of redressability as well. According to Justice Scalia's 
opinion, because Defenders of Wildlife chose to attack the Depart- 
ment of Interior's general policy statement instead of individual 
agency actions funding the challenged activities abroad, there was 
insufficient certainty that the funding agencies would be bound by 
a change in the Department of the Interior consultation policy or- 
dered by a court.94 If the funding agencies did not follow the con- 
sultation requirement, a change in the requirement would not have 
any effect on the projects funded.95 Similarly, according to Justice 
Scalia, Defenders of Wildlife had failed to show that withdrawal of 
United States aid for the challenged projects - which constituted 
only ten percent of the cost of the Sri Lankan project - would 
actually result in the abandonment of the projects and avoidance of 
the feared impactseg6 
92. Id. at 566-67. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. at 56869. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. at 580 (Kennedy, J. cmmmng).  
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This "redressabilityn portion of Justice Scalia's opinion gained 
only a four-vote plurality of the Court, however. Justices Kennedy 
and Souter declined to join this part of the opinion, opining that 
the injury-in-fact issue was dispositive and that the Court need not 
reach the issue of redre~sability.~' 
C. Th Court's Discussion of "Procedural Injury" 
A majority of the Court also rejected the Court of Appeals' find- 
ing that the Defenders of Wildlife had established standing based 
on a purely procedural injury.98 The Court acknowledged that 
Congress, in enacting the Endangered Species Act, had authorized 
"any person" to commence an action to enforce the provisions of 
the ESA against any other person, including the United States Gov- 
ernment, alleged to be in violation of its provi~ions.~g But, relying 
specifically on the separation of powers underpinnings of constitu- 
tional standing doctrine, Justice Scalia's opinion emphatically re- 
jected the ability of Congress to define new procedural injuries as 
being sufficiently substantial to satisfy constitutional standing.lOO 
This section of the Defenders of Wildlife opinion probably has the 
greatest importance for the future application of standing doctrine 
to Congressionally created citizens enforcement actions. In re- 
jecting the concept of a Congressionally created "procedural" right, 
shared equally by each citizen and equally enforceable by each, the 
Court saw no difference between allowing "any citizen" to enforce 
Congressionally created statutory duties of government officials and 
allowing any citizen a right to require the government to comply 
with general constitutional requirements. To allow Congress to do 
so would, according to Justice Scalia, "permit Congress to transfer 
from the President to the courts the Chief Executive's most impor- 
tant constitutional duty, to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed,"'101 and "would permit the courts, with the permission of 
Congress, 'to assume a position of authority over the governmental 
acts of another and coequal departrnent.'"lO* 
But in the course of rejecting such purely procedural rights, the 
Court's opinion acknowledged some distinctions, and implied 
97. Id. 
98. Id. at 571678. 
99. Id. at 571-72; sec 16 U.S.C. 5 1540(g). 
100. Id  at 577 (quoting U.S. Const Art. 111, 53). 
101. Id. at 577 (quoting U.S. Const. Art. 11, 1 3). 
102. Id  at 577 (quoting Mossuchusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447,489 (1923)). 
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some others, that may ultimately be the salvation of the citizens en- 
forcement suit. First, the Court explicitly acknowledged that proce- 
dural rights can be created and enforced if the citizen-enforcer has 
some "concrete interest" in the subject matter of the procedure in 
question.lOs Thus, a person who is about to have a federal facility 
constructed next door will have standing to enforce the NEPA re- 
quirement that an environmental impact statement be prepared 
first.104 In recognizing such "procedural" rights, the Court also ac- 
knowledged that procedural rights are "special" in at least one re- 
spect. According to footnote seven of the Def& of Wildlife 
opinion, the plaintiff who asserts procedural rights "can assert that 
right without meeting all the normal standards for redressability 
and irnmedia~y."~05 Thus, the procedural plaintiff need not show 
that adherence to the correct procedures would actually result in a 
more favorable decision to her, or that the challenged action would 
not nonetheless be taken. 
Second, implicit in the relaxed standards for standing of a plain- 
tiff who claims a procedural injury coupled with a "concrete inter- 
est" in the subject matter is a relaxed requirement for showing 
injury-in-fact resulting from the decision challenged. Justice Scalia 
posits that the individual residing next to a pr6posed federal facility 
has standing to challenge the environmental review procedures fol- 
lowed in approving the facility, without stating a requirement that 
the nextdoor neighbor establish that the proposed facility will 
cause her "discrete" and "perceptible" injury.lo6 Such an injury is 
presumed. 
More explicitly, the Court recognized the "procedural" standing 
of an organization specifically organized around the protection of a 
particular environmental resource, again without a specific showing 
of "perceptible" injury to the organization or its members. Thus, in 
distinguishing Methow Val@ Citizens Council v. Regional Farester,l07 (a 
case in which the Court had seemed to assume, without discussion, 
the standing of the plaintiff organization), the Court stated "we did 
not so much as mention standing [in Methow], for the very good 
reason that the plaintiff was a citizens' council for the area in which 
103. Id at 572 n.7. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 572 n.7. 
106. Id. at 572 & n.8 (members of neighborhood association would "obviously be con- 
cretely affected"). 
107. 833 F.2d 810 (9th Cir. 1987). 
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the challenged construction was to occur, so that its members 
would obviously be afFected."l08 
Finally, also in its discussion of Congressionally defined proce- 
dural rights, the Court offhandedly dropped a tantalizing sugges- 
tion of a distinction that could potentially expand citizens 
enforcement standing substantially. In holding that "injury-in-fact" 
on the plaintiffs part remained part of the irreducible minimum of 
Article I11 (and separation of powers) standing, the Court suggested 
that a different rule might apply if the suit were not against the 
government, but against a private violator of a Congressional act. 
According to the Court, "it is clear that in suits against the govern- 
ment, at least, the concrete injury requirement must remain."log 
This possible distinction is also suggested by the Court's distinction 
of qui tam actions in its discussion of the concrete injury 
requirement.' lo 
Although the Court's rejection of purely procedural injury as a 
basis for standing has some troubling implications for citizens en- 
forcement standing, Justice Scalia's majority opinion leaves consid- 
erable room for the continued vitality of citizens enforcement suits. 
First, Defenden of Wildlife leaves room for Congressionally created 
citizens' "procedural" standing where the citizens have a concrete 
interest in the environmental resource at issue. Second, Def&s of 
Wildlife acknowledges a presumption of standing for citizens groups 
composed of citizens in the area affected by the government action. 
Finally, Defenhs of Wildlife suggests the possibility of broader stand- 
ing where suit is brought not against the government, but against a 
private actor. 
D. Jzlstice Kennedy's Separate Acknowledgement of Congressional 
Authority to Articulate N m  Injuries-in-Fact 
Although joining all but the redressability discussion of Justice 
Scalia's opinion, Justice Kennedy (joined by Justice Souter) wrote a 
separate concurrence in order to emphasize his view that standing 
doctrine must be sensitive to changes and not be limited to com- 
mon law doctrines of injury. Citing the Amem'can Cetacean Society de- 
108. Defendm of WIdh@, 504 U.S. at 573 n.8. 
109. Id. at 578. 
110. Id. at 572-73 (discussion of "the unusual case" where Congress has created a concrete 
private interest by providing for a cash bounty); seegenerally Sunstein, s u p ,  note 2, at 170-177 
(discussing history of qui tam actions) & 232-234 (suggesting system of cash bounties to give 
printe plaintiffs Article 111 stake in enforcement litigation). 
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cision, Justice Kennedy suggested that he would not completely 
foreclose the possibility of an "animal nexusn or "ecosystem nexusn 
approach to standing on stronger facts. Nor was congress without 
the authority to expand the scope of standing. It had simply failed 
to articulate the proper basis for doing so in the Endangered Spe- 
cies Act citizen suit provision. According to Justice Kennedy: 
In my view, Congress has the power to define injuries and articu- 
late chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy 
where none existed before, and I do not read the Court's opin- 
ion to suggest a contrary view. . . . In exercising this power, how- 
ever, Congress, at the very least, must identify the injury it seeks 
to vindicate and relate the injury to the class of persons entitled 
to bring suit. The citizensuit provision of the Endangered Spe- 
cies Act does not meet these minimum requirements, because 
while the statute purports to confer a right on "any person . . . to 
enjoin . . . the United States and any other governmental instru- 
mentality or agency . . . who is alleged to be in violation of any 
provision of this chapter," it does not of its own force establish 
that there is an injury in "any person" by virtue of "any 
violation."ll1 
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Souter, thus recognizes some 
Congressional leeway to expand the scope of injury-in-fact, so long 
as Congress articulates a rationale for defining some class of af- 
fected plaintiffs. This principle offers more than a ray of hope for 
the continued vitality of the citizens' enforcement suit, particularly 
in the Clean Water Act case, given that the class of "citizens" who 
can commence a suit is specifically limited to those citizens who 
"[have] an interest that is or may be adversely affected." As the 
swing votes for the majority, this position, combined with the posi- 
tions of the three Justices who would have found standing, repre- 
sents the majority view of the Court. 
E.  Jutice Stevens' Concurring Opinion Finding Standing 
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment only, finding standing 
but reversing on the merits of the foreign project consultation is- 
sue."* According to Justice Stevens, the plaintiffs satisfied the con- 
crete interest requirement by having visited the habitats at issue in 
the past or having a professional or avocational interest in the spe- 
cies in question, without necessarily having to show a future intent 
111. Defenders of WldIrjk, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J. concum'ng). 
112. Id. at 581-89 (Stevens, J. cuncummng). 
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to revisit the habitat.lls Stevens likened the nature of plaintiffs' in- 
terest to that of one family member in the well-being of another: 
one need not have a definite future intention to visit one's family 
member to suffer a loss if injury to that family member should oc- 
cur.l14 Similarly, Justice Stevens found the "imminence" require- 
ment to be satisfied by the imminence of the harm to the habitat in 
question, without requiring any imminent intention to return to 
the habitat.115 Stevens also found the redressability requirement to 
be satisfied, as the Executive Branch could be expected to follow an 
authoritative interpretation of the Endangered Species Act by the 
Supreme Court.l16 
F .  Justice Blackmun 's Dissent 
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice O'Conner, also would have 
found that the plaintiffs in D$&s of WiZdlife had standing.117 
Blackmun found sufficient evidence in the record that the plain- 
tiffs' intention to return to the threatened habitat was genuine to 
survive a motion for summary judgment, and felt that requiring the 
plaintiff to iden* a date certain for their return was an "empty 
formality,"ll8 akin to requiring a plaintiff claiming a decline in 
property values to prove the date he intended to sell his property, 
or an employment discrimination plaintiff to prove the date she 
would be ready to start work.llg Justice Blackmun would also ac- 
cept the ecosystem nexus and animal nexus approaches to stand- 
ing, recognizing that environmental harms may affect ecosystems 
spread out across the globe, and that one with a professional inter- 
est in a species suffers a loss upon the loss of wild populations of 
that species.120 Justice Blackrnun rejected the plurality's redres- 
sability holding: the funding agencies would be bound by the 
Court's ruling not only because it would be the last word on the 
subject, but also would be collaterally estopped because of their vir- 
tual participation in the litigation.121 
113. Id. at 583-84. 
114. Id. at 584 n.2. 
115. Id. at 582-83. 
116. Id  at 58485. 
117. Id. at 589-606 (Blackmun, J. dissenting). 
118. Id. at 592. 
119. Id. at 593. 
120. Id. at 59495. 
121. Id. at 595-98. 
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Justice Blackmun also wrote extensively concerning Congress' 
ability to grant procedural rights, and noted that in the modern 
administrative state, Congress does not simply legislate in the "black 
and whiten of mandates and prohibitions, but in "procedural shades 
of gray."122 These procedures, such as the National Environmental 
Policy Act,123 as well as the Endangered Species Act, are designed to 
protect some environmental interest. Justice Blackmun responds to 
the separation of powers concerns expressed by the majority by 
pointing out that Congress' choice of enacting procedural require- 
ments as opposed to substantive mandates is designed to maximize 
executive discretion, and not to aggrandize Congress at the ex- 
pense of the executive.124 Blackmun acknowledged that "[tlhere 
may be factual circumstances in which a Congressionally imposed 
procedural requirement is so insubstantially connected to the pre- 
vention of a substantive harm that it cannot be said to work any 
conceivable injury to an individual litigant."125 But Justice Black- 
mun apparently found a sufficient link to potential injury under the 
ESA procedures to find standing in Defenders of Wildlije.126 
Despite Defenders o l  Wildlife's rejection of standing in the case 
before it, and despite some sweeping language in Justice Scalia's 
opinion for the majority, there is substantial common ground be- 
tween Justices in the majority and in the dissent, and certain s u p  
port for Congressionally articulated rights that will give rise to 
injury in fact. Indeed, comparing the concumng opinions of Jus- 
tice Kennedy (joined by Souter) and Stevens and the dissenting 
opinion of Blackmun (joined by 07Conner), there is apparent 
agreement among a majority of the Justices then on the Court for 
the proposition that Congress may define new injuries as long as it 
articulates some link to potential injury to an individual litigant, as 
well as for the proposition that a vocational or avocational interest 
in an animal species may, under some circumstances give rise to 
standing without a showing of actual physical exposure to the 
threatened individuals of the species. 
122. Id. at 602. 
123. 42 U.S.C. 55 43214370(d). 
124. Defadm of WiIdItife, 504 U.S. at 604 (Blackmun, J. aksenting). 
125. Id. at 606. 
126. Curiously, Justice Blackmun expressed no opinion on the merits of plaintiffs' claim, 
or whether he would affirm or reverse on the merits. It is thus not clear whether Blackmun's 
ultimate position was any diierent from that of Justice Stevens. 
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Moreover, even Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court leaves s u b  
stantial territory left to citizens enforcement standing in its explicit 
acknowledgement that so-called "procedural* rights may exist and 
give rise to injury-in-fact without necessarily showing the causal con- 
nection otherwise required, and its tantalizing suggestion that suits 
not against the government are different. 
VI. THE SPECTRUM OF APPROACHES TO CLEAN WATER ACT 
CITIZENS ENFORCEMENT STANDING 
The Clean Water Act's citizens enforcement provisions were ini- 
tially lightly used.l27 However, by the 1980s, several environmental 
organizations launched programs for the systematic enforcement of 
Clean Water Act requirements using the citizen suit vehicle,l28 and 
much of citizens enforcement suit standing doctrine developed in 
this period - following the Supreme Court's decisions in Mort012 
(1972), SCRAP (1973), and Duke Power (1978), but before the 
Court's decision in Lujan v. D@&s of Wildlife (1992). The range 
of possible approaches to citizens enforcement standing range 
from the strictest possible approach, taking the elements of "injury- 
in-fact" and "causation" literally to require a citizen-plaintiff to es- 
tablish a scientifically measurable harm to a resource with an 
equally demonstrable impact upon an individual plaintiffs enjoy- 
ment of that resource, to the concept of universal citizens standing, 
that is, the concept expressed by Senator Muskie that every citizen 
of the United States, regardless of geographic location, has a shared 
interest in the integrity of the nation's waters sufficient to create a 
justiciable case or controversy against a violator of Clean Water Act 
provisions. 
At least prior to Defendem of Wildlife, no court had embraced 
either of these extremes. However, various courts have discussed 
these approaches in the course of developing their approach to citi- 
zen suit standing. These courts have developed additional, inter- 
mediate approaches, resulting in a spectrum of citizens 
enforcement standing doctrine. This spectrum includes, from 
strictest to most liberal, the "causation-in-fact" approach, the "pa- 
rameter" approach, the "resource-based approach, and the "uni- 
versal standing" approach. These approaches, and the courts' 
127. See Jeffrey G. Miller, Citizen Suits: Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control 
Laws § 2.3 (Wiley & Sons, 1987). 
128. Id. at 11-15. 
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treatment of them both before and after the Defenders of WiIdlife de- 
cision, are discussed below. 
A. The Causation-in-Fact Appoach 
As noted, the most stringent possible approach to Clean Water 
Act enforcement standing would take the Article I11 requirements 
of "perceptible inju~y-in-fact," "causation," and "redressability" at 
their most literal. Thus, a plaintiff might be required to plead 
(and, at summary judgment or trial, to offer proof) that pollution 
of a waterway has scientifically demonstrable impacts that are detri- 
mental to that plaintiffs use of the water body, such as actual mor- 
tality rates in fish or other species of recreational value, actual 
health risks to humans swimming or fishing in the waterway, or ac- 
tual, observable aesthetic impacts. In addition, and more problem- 
atically, the plaintiff could be required to prove that these injuries 
are "causally related" to the Clean Water Act violations in a "but for 
cause" sense - that is, that in the absence of the defendant's viola- 
tions, the observed and proven detrimental impacts would not have 
occurred. Similarly, in order to meet the strictest possible applica- 
tion of the "redressabilityn requirement, the plaintiff might be re- 
quired to prove that the elimination of the defendant's own 
contribution to pollution of the water body in question would alle- 
viate the specific detrimental impacts of which the plaintiff 
complains. 
Such an approach would pose insurmountable obstacles for 
many Clean Water Act citizen suits. The Clean Water Act explicitly 
rejected a regulatory regime in which dilution of pollutants by the 
receiving water body excused the polluter from compliance in favor 
of a strict liability regime in which all additions of pollutants to the 
water body, regardless of impacts, are banned. Under this regime, 
many clear cut violations of the Clean Water Act will not have scien- 
tifically demonstrable impacts on fish or other aquatic organisms. 
For example, the first industrial or municipal discharger on a pris- 
tine lake might commence discharging pollutants without a permit, 
or in excess of technology-based permit limits, but without any im- 
mediately measurable, or even imminently measurable, impact on 
the aquatic ecosystem due to the initial assimilative capacity of the 
water body. The Clean Water Act clearly intends to make such vio- 
lations enforceable immediately, and not only after proof of dam- 
age to the ecosystem arises. 
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Beyond the problem of proving measurable damage to the 
aquatic ecosystem, the problem of proving actual causation would 
prove even more insurmountable. Even where a water body is so 
grossly polluted that the effects of pollution are readily observed 
and scientifically measured, proof of the source of the particular 
pollution causing the impacts, or that one particular discharger is 
the "but-for" cause of the pollution impacts on a water body with 
many dischargers, may be all but impossible. Precisely these 
problems of proof in enforcement cases are what led the Congress 
to reject the Water Quality Act in favor of the Clean Water Act. 
This inevitable contradiction between Congress' strict liability re- 
gime in enacting the Clean Water Act, and the stated "injury" and 
"causationn elements of standing doctrine have lead those courts 
that have considered arguments for this stringent "causation-in- 
factn test to reject it. For example, in Public Inwest Research Group of 
New Jmq, v. Powell Duffiyn Terminals, Inc.,lZ9 the Third Circuit re- 
jected an argument for strict proof of causation, explicitly relying 
on the purposes of the Clean Water Act as well as Article 111: 
Plaintiffs need not show "to a scientific certainty" that the oil they 
saw came from [defendant's] effluent. This tort-like causation is 
not required by Article I11 and is apparently an attempt by [de- 
fendant] to negate the strict liability standard of the Act. Since 
the Act forecloses [defendant] from raising such an argument at 
the liability stage, [defendant] attempts to raise it under the 
guise of standing. 
Other courts have similarly rejected arguments for strict proof of 
causation to establish Clean Water Act enforcement standing.lsl 
It is obviously not a complete answer to the Article 111 standing 
inquiry to state that a requirement of strict proof of causation 
would negate the statutoly requirements of strict liability for Clean 
Water Act violations. D e f e n h  of Wildlife suggests that the Constitu- 
tion imposes some limit on the extent to which Congress, by legisla- 
tion, may define the outer limits of standing. D e f i s  of WiZdlife 
itself did not directly address the kind of causation and "injury-in- 
factn issues that arise in Clean Water Act suits, but its language 
might be read to support a strict approach to determination of the 
issues of "injury" and "causation." 
129. 913 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1990). 
130. Id. at 73 n.lO. 
131. See P.LRG. v. AT&T Bell Labs., 617 F. Supp. 1190 (D.N.J. 1985); Chesapeake Bay 
Found., Inc. V. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 608 F. Supp. 440 (D. Md. 1985). 
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B. The Parameter Appfoach 
Some of the courts that have rejected arguments for application 
of a strict "injury" and "causationn approach have adopted a middle 
ground that, in effect, requires proof of a perceptible injury and 
then presumes a causal relationship between the injury and the vio- 
lation as long as there is some plausible connection between the 
violation and injury. Under this approach, the Clean Water Act citi- 
zen-plaintiff must establish that pollution of a water body causes 
perceptible impacts on her enjoyment of that water body - for 
example, that visible oil slicks or turbidity in the water offend her 
aesthetically, or that toxic pollutants have killed fish or wildlife or 
resulted in health advisories against consumption of fish - that 
interfere with her regular enjoyment of the water body. 
Next, the plaintiff must establish that the kinds of impacts identi- 
fied are caused by the kinds of permit violations complained of. 
Thus, specific permit parameters must be associated with specific 
kinds of perceptible environmental impacts - that is, violations of 
oil and grease parameters are related to oil slicks, and violations of 
toxics standards may be correlated with killing of wildlife or health 
advisories against fish consumption. To this extent, the "parame- 
ter" approach is similar to the strictest "causation-in-fact" test, i n  
that the plaintiff must identify specific environmental harms that 
have had a perceivable impact on her, and causally relate these im- 
pacts to the complained of conduct. The "parameter" approach 
stops short, however, of requiring proof that it was the defendant's 
own pollution that in fact caused the plaintiffs injuries, and thus 
avoids the most serious problem of a strict application of "injury-in- 
fact" and "causation" requirements of standing doctrine. 
The leading case for the "parametern approach is P.I.RG v. Powell 
Duffiyn Tminals, Inc.lS* In PoweU Dubn,  the Third Circuit upheld 
the standing of individual members of an environmental organiza- 
tion, based on their regular use of the affected water body (the Kill 
Van Kull), and their aesthetic offense at the sight of oil sheens on 
the water, the brown color of the water, and the bad odors emanat- 
ing from the water.lss The defendants submitted expert affidavits 
asserting that the defendants' discharges could not, to a scientific 
certainty, affect the water quality of the Kill Van Kull in the vicinity 
of the park used by the plaintiffs, and that the Kill Van Kull was so 
132. 913 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1990). 
133. Id at 71. 
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polluted by other sources of pollution that elimination of the de- 
fendant's discharges would not perceptibly improve the water qual- 
ity of the Kill Van Kull anywhere.'% In other words, the Powell 
Duffryn defendants relied upon precisely the scientific causation ar- 
guments that were successfully used to stymie enforcement efforts 
under the Water Quality Act, and which Congress specifically 
sought to eliminate by adopting the strict liability scheme of the 
Clean Water Act. 
As noted above, the Third Circuit emphatically rejected this at- 
tempt to perform an end run around the Clean Water Act's strict 
liability scheme under the guise of Article I11 standing. The court 
also, however, rejected an approach that would have found any vio- 
lation of a permit provision presumptively to satisfy the injury and 
causation requirements.ls5 Instead, the court announced the pa- 
rameter-based approach to Clean Water Act standing: 
Although we agree that a permit exceedence alone is not suB- 
cient to establish the second prong of Vallq, Forge, the facts are 
sufficient here to trace PIRG's injuries to PDT's discharges. 
The requirement that plaintiff's injuries be "fairly traceable" to 
the defendant's conduct does not mean that plaintiffs must show 
to a scientific certainty that defendant's effluent, and defendant's 
effluent alone, caused the precise harm suffered by the plaintiffs. 
A plaintiff need not prove causation with absolute scientific rigor 
to defeat a motion for summary judgment. The "fairly traceable" 
requirement of the VaUqr Forge test is not equivalent to a require- 
ment of tort causation. Cf. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmm- 
tal St+ Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 78, 57 L.Ed. 2d. 595, 98 S.Ct. 
2620 (1978). 
The standing requirement ensures that parties will not "con- 
vert the judicial process into 'no more than a vehicle for the vin- 
dication of the value interests of concerned bystanders."' Vallq, 
Forge, 454 U.S. at 473 (quoting Unikd States v. SCRAP, 412 US. 
669, 687, 37 L.Ed. 2d 254, 93 S.Ct. 2405 (1973)). In order to 
demonstrate that they are more than "concerned bystanders," 
plaintiffs need only show that there is a "substantial likelihood" 
that defendant's conduct caused plaintiffs' harm. Duke Power Co., 
438 U.S. at 75 note 20 (1978). In a Clean Water Act case, this 
likelihood may be established by showing that a defendant has 1) 
discharged some pollutant in concentrations greater than al- 
lowed by its permit 2) into a waterway in which plaintiffs have an 
interest which is or may be adversely affected by the pollutant 
134. Id. at 72. 
135. Id. 
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and that 3) this pollutant causes or contributes to the kinds of 
injuries alleged by the plaintiffs.ls6 
Significantly, this approach does not require proof that the actual 
pollutants from the defendant's facility caused the specific harm to 
the plaintiff. The plaintiff need only establish that the types of pol- 
lutants emitted by the defendant in excess of its permit limitations 
caused the types of injuries suffered by the plaintiff. Thus, it was 
sufficient for the plaintiff in Powell DufJiyn to establish that he suf- 
fered aesthetic injuries due to the effect of an oily sheen on the 
surface of the water of Kill Van Kull, and that Powell Duffryn Termi- 
nals was exceeding its permit limitations for oil and grease. Be- 
cause oil and grease exceedences cause the kind of injury suffered 
by the plaintiff, there was sufficient causal relation between his in- 
jury and his stake in the suit, and the violation complained of to 
satisfy the causal relationship test.ls7 
The Powell , D u h n  court also considered the "redressability" re- 
quirement of standing doctrine. The court found the causal rela- 
tionship between the defendant's discharges and general pollution 
conditions sufficient to establish redressability: "If [Powell Duffryn 
Terminals] complies with its permit, the pollution in the Kill Van 
Kull will decrease."ls* The court also recognized that the deter- 
rence effect of a civil penalty assessment would support redres- 
sability; that is, that the collection of penalties from Powell Duffryn 
Terminals, as authorized by Clean Water Act section 505, would 
serve both general and specific deterrence purposes - reducing 
future pollution of the waterway both by Powell Duffryn and by 
other would be polluters.lsg 
Several other courts have adopted the Powell Duffryn "pararne- 
term based approach, and this approach may fairly be said to be the 
prevailing test for standing in Clean Water Act cases.'* The "pa- 
136. Id 
137. Id at 73. 
138. Id 
139. Id The Third Circuit cited several other decisions that have also recognized the 
redressability function sewed by assessment of civil penalties. See Chesapeake Bay Found., 
Inc. v. Gwalmey of Smithfield, Ltd., 890 F.2d 690, 695 (4th Cir. 1989); Sierra Club v. Simkins 
Indus., Inc., 847 F.2d 1109 (4th Cir. 1988), c&. denied 491 U.S. 904 (1989); P.I.RG. v. AT&T 
Bell Labs, 617 F. Supp. 1190, 1200.01 (D.N.J. 1985). 
140. Sz, e.g., Save Our Community v. E.P.A., 971 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1992); N.RD.C. v. 
Watkins, 954 F.2d 974 (4th Ci. 1992); P.LRG. v. Shell Oil Co., 840 F. Supp. 712 (N.D. Cal. 
1994); Concerned Area Residents for the Environment v. Southview Farm, 834 F. Supp. 1410 
(W.D.N.Y. 1993). rev2 on other grounds, 34 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 1994); cert. denied, 115 S. Ct  1793 
(1995). 
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rarneter" based approach provides a workable compromise for a p  
plication of Article I11 standing doctrine to Clean Water Act citizen 
suits, and avoids the worst contradictions that a literal application 
of the "causation" and "redressability" requirements might bring. It 
does not, however, provide a completely satisfactory solution to the 
problem of Clean Water Act citizens enforcement standing. It does 
not address violations other than permit exceedences or parameter 
excursions, such as reporting requirements, or failure to obtain a 
permit in the first pIace.141 
By maintaining the requirement of an injury that is objectively 
perceivable by the plaintiff, the parameter approach still falls short 
of the Clean Water Act's goals of providing for vigorous enforce- 
ment before the effects of pollution have reached the stage that 
they are observable by the unaided senses. Under the Powell D u f f n  
approach to standing, a permit holder with a plant on an otherwise 
unpolluted lake or river could violate its permit with impunity until 
the "assimilative" capacity of the receiving water body was ex- 
hausted. A user of the lake or river might not be able to show the 
kind of injury contemplated by Powell D u h n  until the water was 
seriously polluted, and foul odors, dead fish, or oily sheens might 
be readily observed. In other words, the Clean Water Act citizens 
enforcement "medicine" would be unavailable until the patient was 
dead, or at least grievously ailing. This was not the intent of Con- 
gress in specifically rejecting the Water Quality Act approach of 
non-regulation of water pollution until after the assimilative capac- 
ity of the water body was reached. 
C. Resource-Based Approach 
Other courts have taken an approach more consistent with the 
wording of the Clean Water Act citizen suit provision, and with its 
legislative history. Picking up on the focus in Sierra Club v. Morton 
on the regular use of an environmental resource for recreational, 
aesthetic, or other environmental purposes, these cases recognize 
standing in any individual who demonstrates an "interest which is 
or may be adversely affected" by showing regular recreational use of 
141. Some courts have found their way around the problem of reporting violations by 
finding a Congressionally created "informational" right, invasion of which is a separate in- 
jury. See, e.6, P.LRG. v. Yates Indus. Inc., 757 F. Supp. 438, 443 (D.N.J. 1991). Recognition 
of Congressionally created "informational" rights as sufficient to create an injury-in-fact to 
support Article I11 standing ought to support a broader view of standing for permit violations 
as well. 
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the water body, without requiring a showing of specific injury per- 
ceivable by the plaintiff or traceable to the defendant, other than 
the contribution of pollutants to the water body. 
This approach to the standing question might be dubbed the "re- 
source-based approach, as it focuses on the plaintiffs interest in 
the resource affected by the defendant's contribution of pollutants, 
and not on specific impacts of pollution. The leading c&e for this 
approach is NRDC v. Outboard Marine Corp.14* In Outboard Marine, 
NRDC relied on the standing of its members who lived adjacent to, 
walked along, and swam in the waters that received Outboard 
Marine's discharges. NRDC sought to challenge Outboard 
Marine's exceedence of its discharge limitations for PCBs, but did 
not submit evidence of any specific harm suffered by its individual 
members due to PCB pollution. The court rejected Outboard 
Marine's motion for summary judgment on standing grounds: 
OMC argues those affiants fail to satisfy the standing require- 
ments of such cases as M d o n  by not demonstrating through 
their affidavits and later depositions that they have personally suf- 
fered an injury from OMC's putatively illegal discharges. OMC 
characterizes NRDC's members as merely concerned about pol- 
lution of the affected waterways generally, with their alleged inju- 
ries neither fairly traceable to OMC's conduct nor redressable by 
the relief sought in this case. Understandably, OMC cites no case 
in which a court has held similar showings insufficient for stand- 
ing under the Act. Its argument stems from a basic misunder- 
standing of the type of injury NRDC and its members need to 
demonstrate. It is enough for NRDC to show its members use 
the water into which OMC's allegedly illegal discharges flow (see, 
e.g., Siara Club v. SCM Cqb.,  747 F.2d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 1984) 
(standing could be established by "a concrete indication that Si- 
erra Club or one or more of its members used the Wolcott Creek 
tributary or would be affected by its pollution")). Such standing 
is not undermined because NRDC's members have not explicitly 
said they are harmed by OMC's permit violations. It is enough 
that they identify harm to their aesthetic or environmental inter- 
ests from the overall pollution of the waterways. If OMC is 
proved to be violating the terms of its permit, that alone consti- 
tutes injury to those using the affected waters (see P.I. R G. v. Geor- 
gia Pacific C*., 615 F .  Supp. 1419, 1424 (D.N.J. 1985) ("The 
Clean Water Act presumes unlawful discharges to reduce water 
quality because definite proof of the proposition is often nearly 
impossible") ) . 
142. 692 F. Supp. 801 (N.D. Ill. 1988). 
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Any requirement that NRDC must prove its members are 
harmed by discharges specifically traceable to OMC would "virtu- 
ally emasculate the citizen's suit provision by making it impossi- 
ble for the plaintiff to demonstrate standing" Cksapeah Bay 
Found. v. Bethleha Steel Cmp., 608 F .  Supp. 440, 446 (D. Md. 
1985)). Indeed, such a causation standard would compel a 
stricter showing for standing than for liability under the Act, 
where proof of a permit violation is sufficient. (Gemgia Pmjic, 
615 F .  Supp. at 1424). Thus NRDC demonstrates the necessary 
link between OMC's activities and the identified injury to 
NRDC's members as long as it can prove OMC's permit viola- 
tions. Relatedly it follows that proof of such violations will suffice 
to couple the redress of NRDC's members' injuries with this 
Court's enjoining or penalizing of the vi~lations.'~~ 
Like the approach of both the majority and Justice Douglas's dis- 
sent in the Sierra Club v. Mdon case, the resource-based approach 
to standing focuses on the relationship of the plaintiff to the re- 
source affected, or potentially affected, by the defendant's conduct, 
rather than focussing on observable harm to the resource. As the 
court cogently explains in OMC, this approach does the greatest 
justice to the Clean Water Act's strict liability scheme as well as its 
grant of standing to "any person having an interest which is or may 
be adversely affected," and the explicit references in the legislative 
history to the Mdon test. Although the OMC court's recognition 
that proof of a permit violation "alone constitutes injury to those 
using the affected waters" has been explicitly rejected by the Third 
Circuit in Powell Duff~n, the Second Circuit, at least implicitly, and 
other courts, more explicitly, appear to have adopted the OMC re- 
source-based approach. 
The OMC court's rejection of any requirement that plaintiffs 
prove an observable impact on the water body or their use and en- 
joyment of it in order to establish standing is clearly most consistent 
with the Clean Water Act's strict liability approach to water pollu- 
tion and the Act's rejection of the water quality-based approach of 
143. Id. at 807-08. 
144. See Friends of the Earth v. Consol. Rail Corp., 768 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1985); Sierra Club 
v. SCM Corp., 747 F.2d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 1984)(dicta); Atl. States Legal Found. v. Universal 
Tool, 735 F. Supp. 1404, 1411 (N.D. Ind. 1990); Ark. Wildlife Fed'n v. Bekaert Corp., 791 F. 
Supp. 769, 775776 (W.D. Ark. 1992). The Fourth Circuit has also suggested, in dicta, that 
recreational use of the affected water body was by itself sufficient to satisfy the "injury-in-fact" 
requirements of standing doctrine. Chesapeake Bay Found. v. American Recovery Co., 769 
F.2d 207, 209 (4th Cir. 1985); see aLFoSierra Club v. Simkins Indus., Inc., 847 F.2d 1109, 1112 
& n.3, 1113 (4th Cir. 1988) (one member of organization who hiked near impacted water 
body sufficient to support standing). 
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the Water Quality Act. But does this test survive Justice Scalia's rea- 
soning in D e f i s  of WiIdlije that, in order to be constitutionally 
cognizable, a claimed Article I11 injury-in-fact must be "concrete," 
"particularized," "perceptible," and "tangible"? For reasons ex- 
plained below, this author believes that the resource-based ap- 
proach to standing not only survives Defenders of WiIdliJe, but gains 
support from it. 
D. Universal Standing 
Taken literally, the Clean Water Act's declaration that "any citi- 
zen" may commence an action to enforce its prohibitions against 
water pollution could be read to grant universal enforcement stand- 
ing, at least as a statutory matter, to any citizen of the United States, 
regardless of her geographical location or use of the water body 
affected. Of course, the Clean Water Act's definition of the term 
"citizen" limits its scope to those persons having an interest "which 
is or may be adversely affected," and Senator Muskie's explicit refer- 
ence to the Morton decision seems to demand an interpretation that 
limits enforcement standing to those with some special relationship 
to the affected water body. Senator Muskie also stated, however, 
that the standing provision was meant to grant standing to the 
outer reaches permitted by the Constitution, and he specifically 
cited the example of a citizen of one state whose interest in enforce- 
ment of the environmental laws generally would suffice to allow 
him to enforce the Clean Water Act even against a violator in a 
remote state. 
Although this legislative history suggests some Congressional in- 
tent to grant universal enforcement standing, efforts to invoke such 
standing have been almost completely unsuccessful in the courts.145 
For example, in Sierra Club v. SCM C~qb . , '~~  the Second Circuit em- 
phatically rejected Sierra Club's effort to rely on its general interest 
in environmental enforcement (as it had sought to do in Morton), 
and suggested instead that to establish standing Sierra Club had to 
identify some members who used the water body in question. As 
noted above, in the National Sea Clammers case the United States 
Supreme Court also rejected the argument that the citizen suit pro- 
145. But seeMetro. Washington Council for Clean Air v. Disaict of Columbia, 51 1 F.2d 809 
(D.C. Cir. 1975). 
146. 747 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1984). 
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vision of the Clean Water Act was meant to provide an action for 
plaintiffs' without injury-in-fact. 14' 
Of course, the Defenders of Wildlife decision appears to foreclose 
the constitutional permissibility of a Congressional grant of en- 
forcement standing to persons without injury-in-fact, "in suits 
against the government, at least." One commentator has declared 
the concept of citizens enforcement to be dead after Defenders of 
WiIdlife.l48 But Def& of Wildlife's implicit reservation of judg- 
ment concerning suits not against the government - i.e., private 
enforcement suits against private violators - leaves at least a crack 
in the door open for private attorneys general to enforce Clean 
Water Act requirements without proof of individual interest in the 
water body affected. 
VII. D ~ N D E R T  OF w ~ ~ i w  1S IMPACT ON CITIZEN SUIT STANDING 
Despite Defenders of Wildlife's sweeping language, the decision cer- 
tainly has not settled issues of citizens enforcement standing under 
the Clean Water Act. Post-Def&s of Wildlife standing decisions 
run a gamutjust as wide as the pre-Defenden of Wildlife decisions did. 
Although the strict "causation-in-fact" approach has garnered a lit- 
tle more judicial support since Defenders of Wildlife than it enjoyed 
before, courts have also reaffirmed the parameter approach as well 
as the resource-based approach to standing subsequent to D$&s 
of Wildlife. The Def& of Wildlife decision has neither tolled the 
death knell for citizens enforcement litigation, as predicted by 
some, nor has it promoted clarity or predictability in the standing 
tests applied to citizens enforcement suits. 
A. P o s t - D e f i  of Wildlife Support for Resource-Based Standing 
At least one decision subsequent to Defenders of Wildlife has sug- 
gested that recreational and aesthetic use of a receiving water body, 
combined with the violation of the Clean Water Act's permitting 
requirement, suffices to establish injury-in-fact for standing pur- 
poses, without a showing that the water body has suffered observa- 
ble pollution impacts. In Sierra Club v. Cedar Point Oil,149 the Fifth 
Circuit upheld the standing of an environmental organization to 
challenge un-permitted discharges of water into Galveston Bay by 
147. Nut? Sea Clammen, 453 U.S. at 1617. 
148. Sunstein, sup4 note 2 at 164166. 
149. 73 F.3d 546 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. h i e &  117 S. Ct. 57 (1996). 
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an oil well, based on the interests of its members who used Galves- 
ton Bay for swimming, canoeing, and bird-watching, and who lived 
near Galveston Bay. The court's opinion applied a resource based 
approach to injury-in-fact, focusing primarily on the relationship of 
plaintiff's members to the water body affected by the discharge 
rather than on the observable injuries to the water body. The court 
reasoned: 
Cedar Point makes much of the fact that the affiants expressed 
"concern" that the discharge of produced water will impair their 
ability to engage in recreational activities. Such language, Cedar 
Point argues, stated only an interest in eliminating produced 
water discharges into Galveston Bay, and not an injury in fact. 
We find no merit in this contention. Whether the affiants were 
"concerned or "believed or "knew to a moral certainty" that 
produced water would adversely affect their activities on the bay 
is a semantic distinction that makes little difference in standing 
analysis. The requirement that a party demonstrate an injury in 
fact is designed to limit access to the courts to those "who have a 
direct stake in the outcome," Valley Forge Christian Colkge, 454 U.S. 
at 473 (quoting Siara Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740, 31 L.Ed. 
2d 636, 92 S. Ct. 1361 (1972)), as opposed to those who "would 
convert the judicial process into 'no more than a vehicle for the 
vindication of the value interests of concerned bystanders."' Id. 
*quoting United Stales v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669,687,93 S. Ct. 2405, 
37 L.Ed. 2d 254 (1973)). Sierra Club's affiants are concerned, 
but they are not mere "bystanders." Two of the *ants live near 
Galveston Bay and all of them use the bay for recreational activi- 
ties. All of the affiants expressed fear that the discharge of p r e  
duced water will impair their enjoyment of these activities 
because these activities are dependent upon good water quality. 
Clearly, Sierra Club's affiants have a "direct stake" in the out- 
come of this 1aw~ui t . l~~  
This holding is a strong articulation of a resource-based a p  
proach to standing. The plaintiff demonstrated its "stake" in the 
controversy by showing its interest in the waters into which the pol- 
lutants were deposited and this stake was injury enough to support 
standing.151 The Fifth Circuit did not, however, attempt to square 
this result with the approach to standing taken by the Supreme 
Court in Defkndm of Wildlife. In fact, the Defenders of Wildlife decision 
is not cited or discussed by the Cedar Point Oil court. 
150. Id. at 556. 
151. The court did go on, as an alternative holding, to note that at least one of the plain- 
tiffs affiants complained of actual degradation of water quality in Galveston Bay, including 
discolored water, oil, and grease. Id. at 556557. 
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B. Cases Reafinning the Powell D u h n  Parameter-Based Approach 
Despite its non-literal application of the causation and redres- 
sability elements of Article I11 standing articulated in Defenders of 
Wildlife, several circuits have reaffirmed the Powell D u h n  "parame- 
ter" based approach to standing. The Third Circuit itself so ruled 
in N.RD.C. v. Texa~o.~~* More recently, the Fifth Circuit cited Powell 
Dufhn approvingly in affirming Clean Water Act enforcement 
standing for an organization whose members used the affected 
body of water for recreational activities including swimming, canoe- 
ing, and bird watching, and one of whose members claimed to be 
offended by malodorous and discolored water in the general vicin- 
ity of the defendant's discharge.153 
The Eastern District of Texas has also explicitly applied the Powell 
D u h n  approach to affirm the standing of an organization whose 
members were recreational users of a body of water several miles 
downstream from the body of water of the defendant's dis- 
charge.'" In a case brought by Friends of the Earth against Chev- 
ron, the District Court rejected the Chevron's argument that 
because its discharge constituted less that 0.17% of the flow into the 
lake used by the plaintiffs members, it could not possibly be the 
cause of pollution impacts observed by the Friends of the Earth's 
members. The Court quoted Powell Duffin's suggestion that the 
plaintiff need not prove causation to a scientific certainty. The Dis- 
152. 2 F.3d 493 (3d Cir. 1993). 
153. Cedar Puint Oil Co.,73 F.3d 546. Although the Cedar Point court purported to apply the 
PuweU-Duhn test to affirm standing based on-the claims of the one member who 
could point to perceptible pollution of the receiving water body, some of the language in this 
opinion is more consistent with a broader, resource-based approach to standing, as discussed 
supra, text accompanying notes 145144. The Cedar Point decision also holds explicitly that 
citizens have standing to bring an enforcement action against an unpermitted discharge in 
violation of the Clean Water Act permitting requirements even where the discharger could 
have discharged the same amount of pollutants with a permic "Because Cedar Point does not 
even have a permit for its discharges of produced water, any discharge exceeds that which is 
allowable under the CWA" Id. at 558. This is an important principle for standing, as the 
Clean Water Act prohibits any discharge "except in compliance withn its permitting provi- 
sions. Under this reasoning, any discharge without a permit, or under a permit whose provi- 
sions are otherwise being violated, is anillegal discharge, and pollution-injuries of the son 
related to the discharge are injuries that support standing, whether or not those discharges 
exceed the amounts that might have been permissible had the permit been complied with. 
See ako Atl. States Legal Found. v. Karg Bros., Inc., 841 F. Supp. 51, 55 (N.D.N.Y. 1994) 
(holding that violation of pretreatment regulations supports standing on the part of users of 
river into which sewage pretreatment plant discharges, even though violation did not result 
in exceedence of any permit parameter by the sewage treatment plant). 
154. F h d r  ofthe Earth v. Chnmm Chem. Co., 900 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Tex. 1995). 
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trict Court also relied on the deterrence effect of a penalty judg- 
ment to support its finding that the redressability requirement is 
satisfied.155 The District of New Jersey, Northern District of Ohio, 
and District of California have also applied the Powell Dufhn test, 
since Defenders of Wildlife, to find standing on the part of users of 
water bodies downstream from the challenged discharge.156 In so 
doing, both the Ohio and California courts distinguished Defhders 
of Wildlife on its facts. 
Interestingly, none of these other decisions reaffirming the pa- 
rameter standing approach discussed Lujan v. Def& of Wildlife or 
considered whether that decision had changed the constitutional 
standing requirements applicable to citizens enforcement suits. 
C. "CausatimL-in-Fact " Test 
A few courts addressing enforcement standing issues since the 
Defenders of Wildlife decision have moved towards demanding stricter 
proof of a demonstrably perceptible change in the water body (or 
other environmental resource affected) and the violation com- 
plained. For example, in Fn'ends of Earth v. Crown Cent. Petrol. 
Corp.,l5' the Eastern District of Texas rejected a claim of standing 
by a group of birdwatchers challenging oil and grease discharges to 
a lake, finding insufficient evidence of an imminent perceptible 
harm that could be causally related to the violations complained of: 
Greene and the Pilgrims explained that pollution in Lake Pales- 
tine could cause extinction of certain species of birds due to the 
magnification of its toxic effects as it rose through the food 
chain, the birds being the top predator in the food chain. How- 
ever, what FOE fails to do is establish that any injury to its mem- 
bers' birdwatching pursuits is imminent. FOE's designated 
members noticed no reduction in the wildlife population or any 
adverse conditions to Lake Palestine which might indicate that 
such a reduction was imminent. FOE presents no evidence of 
perceptible harm, FOE merely maintains that pollutants could 
accumulate over time. A possibility that pollutants might eventu- 
ally accumulate and perhaps cause harm does not constitute an 
155. In a later decision, after trial, the F.O.E. v. C h m  court ultimately rejected FOE's 
organizational capacity to represent the individuals identified as its members, as the organi- 
zation lacked formally defined membership criteria. F7iendc of the Earth v. C h m  919 F. 
Supp. 1042 (E.D. Tex. 1996). 
156. Cabjiaia Pub. Znt. Research Group V .  SheU Oil w., 840 F. Supp. 712 (N.D. Cal. 1994) 
(distinguishing Lujan); N.RD.C. v. Vygen Corp., 803 F. Supp. 97 (N.D. Ohio 1992) (distin- 
guishing Lujan); P.I.RG. v. N.J. Expressway Auth., 822 F. Supp. 174 (1992). 
157. No. 6:94 CV 489, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16338 (E.D. Tex. Sep. 22, 1995). 
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injury that is "certainly impending." Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 
U.S. 149,158, 109 L.Ed. 135, 110 S.Ct. 1717 (1990). "Standing is 
not an 'ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable,' 
but . . . requires, at the summary judgment stage; a'factual show- 
ing of perceptible harm." Lujan II, 112 S.Ct at 2139 (citations 
omitted). FOE has failed to show an actual or imminent injury. 
Because no injury-in-fact has been established, there can be no 
representational standing.15* 
This approach seems hard to reconcile with the decision by the 
same court in Friends o f t h  Earth v. Chamm C h i c a l  Co. 
More recently, in Public Interest Research Group of NJ v. Magnesium 
Elektron, I ~ C . , ' ~ ~  the Third Circuit vacated a judgment in favor of 
plaintiffs after trial in a Clean Water Act citizens enforcement case, 
even though the court had previously affirmed summary judgment 
in favor of the plaintiffs on the standing issue. The court reasoned 
that the plaintiffs' failure to contradict testimony of the defendant's 
trial expert to the effect that the admitted permit violations had no 
observable negative impact on the receiving water body was a fail- 
ure of proof on. the fundamental jurisdictional issue of standing, 
and required vacation of the judgment despite the court's earlier 
ruling. Citing Lujan, the court reasoned that Congressional intent . 
to remove the injury element from the Clean Water Act violation 
could not overcome the "case or controversy" requirements of the 
Constitution. The Third Circuit also rejected caims that the plain- 
tiffs were injured by the knowledge of the existence of pollution 
and that the threat of future effects of the identified pollution was 
- 
too remote to satisfy an "imminent" injury standard. 
Although the court recognized its earlier Powell Duffin decision, 
it distinguished that case on the grounds that the Powell DufJiyn 
plaintiffs had at least identified observable impacts of pollution on 
the receiving water body. Despite uncontradicted testimony that 
plaintiffs' members were recreational users of the affected water 
body, the court rejected standing on the grounds that the water was 
not yet polluted. 
The Eastern District of Pennsylvania also seems to have moved 
towards a "causation-in-fact" approach to standing, at least under 
the analogous citizen suit provisions of the Clean Air Act. In Ogden 
Projects, Inc. v. N m  Morgan LandJill Company,160 that court rejected 
the standing of an individual plaintiff who sought to challenge the 
158. Id at 22-23. 
159. U.S. App. LEXIS 20846 (3d Cir. 1997). 
160. 911 F. Supp. 863 (E.D. Pa. 1996). 
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failure of a landfill to obtain a Clean Air Act permit for its emissions 
of ozone-causing air contaminants. The plaintiff, although residing 
85 miles from the facility, did reside and recreate in the same ozone 
transport region as the facility, as determined by EPA, which region 
was in non-attainment of air quality standards for ozone. Neverthe- 
less, the court rejected his individual standing, citing his failure to 
offer proof that it was the defendant's pollutant emissions that 
caused his air quality impacts: 
The Individual Plaintiffs offer no evidence regarding the magni- 
tude of the diminished air quality nor the specific direct effect, if 
any, that this diminished air quality will have on their health, en- 
vironmental, and recreational interests. From the fact that the 
air quality in the geographical area surrounding the landfill 
would have been better had Defendant obtained a Part D permit, 
Individual Plaintiffs summarily conclude that their health, envi- 
ronmental and recreational interests suffer injury, without filling 
in the blanks. 
* * *  
The Individual Plaintiffs in the case at bar have made no such 
showing [of how the pollutant discharges impair air quality]. 
They have not offered evidence establishing how much ozone 
will be produced by emissions of VOCs from the landfill. . . . In 
addition, they never established that increased ozone levels 
would be severe enough to affect their health, recreational, or 
environmental interests. . . . Instead, the Individual Plaintiffs cur- 
sorily rely on general EPA recognition that landfill emissions 
present human health hazards. 
* * *  
In short, the individual Plaintiffs are too hasty in drawing a causal 
connection between VOC emissions from the Morgantown Land- 
fill and the potential injury to their health, environmental and 
recreational interests. The individual Plaintiffs therefore have 
not satisfied their burden of proving injury in fact and thus do 
not have standing to bring this action. If they did have standing 
on the facts before us, standing would become automatic for any- 
one living in the Northeast Ozone Transport Region.lG1 
The Ogden decision has plainly adopted a causation-in-fact a p  
proach to standing that would effectively rule out nearly all citizen 
enforcement suits under the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air 
Act. Despite uncontradicted evidence that plaintiffs resided in a 
region declared to be in violation of health-based standards for 
ozone, and that the defendant was illegally contributing ozone- 
causing pollutants to the same air quality area as plaintiffs' resi- 
161. Id. at 869-70 (footnote omitted). 
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dence, the court rejected standing because the plaintiff could not 
identify any actual health impacts that they had suffered; or that the 
unhealthy levels of ozone in the air could be attributed to defend- 
ant's own ozone emissions (rather than some other source). This is 
precisely the impossible burden of proof that strict liability statutes 
such as the Clean Water Act and Clean Air Act sought to avoid. 
The Eastern District of Pennsylvania asserted that this result was 
required by Defenders of Wildlife. Other post-Defenders of Wildlife 
courts have not, however, been compelled to contract standing doc- 
trine so narrowly. The courts reaffirming the parameter- and re- 
source-based approaches to enforcement standing have not, 
however, been able to articulate how these less restrictive standing 
approaches fit into the doctrinal approach expressed in Defenders of 
Wildlife. Indeed, most of these courts have failed to discuss Defenders 
of Wildlife at all. In fact, as the next section of this article explains, 
Defenders of Wildlife does provide support for the less restrictive re- 
source-based approach to standing in Clean Water Act citizen suit 
cases. 
VIII. INJURY-IN-FACT RIGHTLY UNDERSTOOD: PENDERT OF 
w ~ ~ m ' s  SUPPORT FOR PROCEDURAL INJURIES, 
INFORMATIONAL INJURIES, AND OTHER 
INTANGIBLE INJURIES-IN-FACT 
As can be seen from the review of Clean Water Act standing deci- 
sions since Defenders of Wildlife, the Def&s of Wildlife decision has 
failed to settle the law of citizens enforcement standing. Those 
courts that take Def&s of Wildlife's description of the tests for 
standing at their most literal and look for specific, perceptible 
harms to the plaintiff demonstrably related to the defendant's pol- 
lution pose impossibly high standards to establish standing, far be- 
yond what is required to establish liability under the Clean Water 
Act. Other courts have sought to implement the strict liability 
scheme of the Clean Water Act and its clear intention that that 
scheme be enforceable by citizen plaintiffs, but have not satisfacto- 
rily explained how an approach that presumes injury (the resource- 
based approach) or presumes causation (the parameterbased a p  
proach) squares with D e f i  of Wildlife's apparently strict interpre- 
tation of injury-in-fact and its suggestion (at least in Justice Scalia's 
majority opinion) that Congress cannot create a presumed injury- 
in-fact where constitutional injury-in-fact is lacking. 
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Stepping back, it is easy enough to distinguish Defenh of Wildlife 
factually from the typical citizens enforcement suit: Defenden of Wild- 
life, after all, rejected standing on the part of individuals who could 
not definitively state when, if ever, they would return to the vicinity 
of the environmental resource they sought to protect. The typical 
citizen suit plaintiff, on the other hand, has no dimculty establish- 
ing her regular past and anticipated future use of local environ- 
mental resources for fishing, hiking, swimming, drinking, or 
aesthetic enjoyment. What is more difficult is to reconcile the rec- 
ognition of the inchoate harms that may form the basis of a Clean 
Water Act citizen suit with the analytical and semantic framework of 
Defenh of Wildlife, which focuses on "tangible" and "perceptible" 
injuries, but also recognizes standing based on intangible "proce- 
dural" injuries. 
The answer lies with a proper understanding of the sorts of inju- 
ries that may be considered "tangible" within the rubric of the 
Supreme Court's standing decisions, as well as with an understand- 
ing of the overall scheme of the Clean Water Act, which may be 
understood to create environmentally protective intangible rights 
that are every bit as important and worthy of Article I11 recognition 
as the "procedural" rights created by NEPA. 
When these frameworks are properly understood, Supreme 
Court standing doctrine clearly supports at least a resource-based 
approach to standing. The "parameter" approach of Powell DufJiyn 
fails to recognize the very'real stake of a person who satisfies the 
M d o n  test for interest in a protected resource, but who cannot 
demonstrate a preexisting or imminent "perceptible" injury to that 
resource. Defmhs of Wildlife provides explicit support for the 
standing of such an individual plaintiff by recognizing standing of 
such interested parties to enforce intangibles such as "procedural" 
rights. Other Supreme Court standing decisions provide at least 
implicit support for resource-based standing. And, once the plain- 
tiffs interest in enforcing the overall Clean Water Act scheme is 
recognized, the citizen plaintiff should satisfy requirements of "cau- 
sation" and "redressability" as well. 
A. Injuvin-Fact: Intangible Interests Tied to Tangible Resources 
Despite the Court's repeated use of the terms "tangible" and 
"perceptible" to describe the requisite "injury-in-fact" for standing 
purposes, the Supreme Court has in fact been quite receptive to 
standing claims based on intangible and imperceptible injuries 
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throughout the history of environmental standing doctrine, right 
up to and including the Defenders of WiIdZiJe decision. Thus, the Mm- 
ton Court recognized "aesthetic and environmental well-being" as 
interests whose injury would support standing, despite the inher- 
ently intangible nature of these interests.16* Likewise, in Duke 
Power, the Court recognized that "emission of non-natural radiation 
into [plaintiffs'] environment would also seem a direct and present 
injury," based on "our generalized concern about exposure to radi- 
ation and apprehension flowing from the uncertainty about the 
health and genetic consequences of even small emissions."l6~ The 
Duke Power Court did not require proof that nuclear plant emissions 
were likely to cause perceptible health impacts on the plaintiffs, or 
even scientific consensus about its likelihood - a "generalized con- 
cern" and "apprehension" were s~t37cient.l~~ Likewise, the Court 
has explicitly acknowledged Congressionally created informational 
rights, injury to which .constitutes sufficient injury-in-fact, even with- 
out more.165 
Most importantly, Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Defendem of 
WiZdZije itself recognized that Congress could create intangible 
rights, injury to which would support standing, by recognizing that 
"procedural" rights are ~pecial.l6~ The key, to Scalia, is that these 
162. Murim, 405 U.S. at 734. 
163. Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 74. 
164. Keep in mind that the Duke Paoer holding was based on a factual record developed 
after several days of hearings on the standing issue, so its analysis cannot be explained as a 
result of the relaxed burden of proof necessruy at the pleadings or summary judgment stage. 
165. In Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982) the Court upheld the stand- 
ing of minority "testers" to bring enforcement litigation under the Fair Housing Act. Testers 
are members of protected minority groups who pose as potential home buyers or renters in 
order to test real estate agents' compliance with non-discrimination laws. Even though these 
testers were not actually seeking housing (and thus could'not claim injury by reason of hav- 
ing been denied housing opportunities), the Supreme Court upheld their claim to standing 
based on a deprivation of a Congressionally created interest in accurate housing information. 
Deprivation of this accurate information was sufficient to create injury-in-fact, without more. 
166. Justice Scalia also suggested, implicitly, that suits other than those against the govern- 
ment are special. Justice Scalia's emphatic rejection of the possibility of Congressionally cre- 
ated suits in the absence of injury-in-fact had an important qualifier: "in suits against the 
government, at least." The vast majority of the Supreme Court's standing cases, including 
Defendm of Wildlijie, have in fact addressed suits by citizens against various officials and agen- 
cies of the executive branch of the federal govem'ment. It is in these cases that the separa- 
tion of powers concerns articulated by Justice Scalia in Defmdm of Wildlife are implicated 
most strongly. Relatively few of the Supreme Court's standing cases have considered citizens' 
standing in enforcement suits against private, nongovernmental actors; indeed, none of the 
Supreme Court's standing decisions has addressed citizens enforcement standing directly. 
Clearly the separation of powers concerns articulated by Justice Scalia in Def& of Wildlife 
are not implicated in a suit, like the typical citizens enforcement suit, against a non-govern- 
Heinonline - -  22 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 218 1997 
19971 Clean Water Act Standing 219 
"procedural" rights must be linked to some tangible resource that 
the procedural right is meant to protect, and the plaintiff, in turn, 
must demonstrate some sort of protectible interest in that resource 
sufficient to give him a stake in a controversy about procedural 
compliance. If the plaintiff demonstrates the sort of relationship 
that the Marton court requires with respect to the resource that may 
be impacted by the procedure in question, then that plaintiff has 
standing whether or not he has established that tangible, percepti- 
ble injury has followed (or is imminent) as a result of the failure to 
follow the procedure in question. The plaintiffs in D e f i s  of Wild- 
life failed not because their interest in the Endangered Species Act 
consultation requirement was intangible (which it was), but be- 
cause their interest in the environmental subject that would be pro- 
tected by that procedure was too remote and "intangible." 
D e f i s  of Wildlife explicitly recognized that the "procedural" sys- 
tem for the protection of environmental resources established by 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) was "special," at least to 
the extent that NEPA plaintiffs should be excused from the usual 
burdens of proving strict causation and redressability.16' NEPA re- 
quires that a federal agency considering a "major federal action sig- 
mental actor. Enforcement of Congressionally enacted requirements against the private ac- 
tor does not involve the courts in assuming a position of authority over a coequal 
department, but rather puts the courts in their traditional role of applying statutory require- 
ments to individual litigants. 
The Supreme Court's development of standing docmne has occurred almost entirely in 
the context of citizen or taxpayer suits seeking to force compliance by the Executive Branch 
with constitutional or statutoxy requirements. From Fmthingtram v. Melfun, 262 U.S. 447 
(1923), where the plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of federal funding to improve 
maternity care, through the challenge to the disposition of surplus property by the executive 
branch in VaUq Fotge, through the challenge to the Price-Anderson Act in Duke Power and 
right up to the challenge tothe ~ e ~ a r t m e n t  of Interior's endangered species consultation 
procedure in Def& of WIdlifi each of the Supreme Court's major pronouncements on 
standing have been made in the context of a plaintiff asking the Court to step in and tell 
another branch of the federal government what to do. Justice Scalia's offhand suggestion 
that the injury-in-fact requirement is an irreducible minimum "at least in suits against the 
governmentn acknowledges that these separation of powers concerns do not come into play 
when a private citizen seeks to enforce a congression&ly created right against another private 
person. In such a case, the plaintiff does not ask the court to assert authority over a coequal 
branch of government. Rather, the citizen-plaintiff seeks only judicial assenion of authority 
over other persons withii the courts' jurisdiction - the traditional judicial role. This analy- 
sis suggests the possibility of Congressionally created enforcement suits without injury-in-fact. 
Full analysis of this possibility is beyond the scope of this article. 
167. Defadm of W f i p a t  572 & n.7. Although the opinion does not refer explicitly to the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the Court's reference to the "procedural re- 
quirement for an environmental impact statement," id., must be read as a reference to the 
environmental impact statement requirement of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C). 
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nificantly affecting the quality of the human environment" to 
prepare an environmental impact statement disclosing and consid- 
ering the environmental impacts of the action.le8 Justice Scalia's 
majority opinion recognized that the NEPA plaintiff could never 
prove that compliance with NEPA's requirements for preparation 
of an environmental impact statement would necessarily, .or even 
probably, lead to the rejection of the proposed federal action and 
the preservation of the environmental resource in question. Be- 
cause these rights would be otherwise unenforceable, Justice 
Scalia's opinion seemed to recognize a kind of standing by 
necessity. 
The focus of standing inquiry in these circumstances shifts from 
the identifiable harm that flows directly from the procedural viola- 
tion (which is purely an abstraction, i.e., the right to have the 
agency prepare a report disclosing the impacts), to the strength of 
the plaintiffs tangible interest in the resource that the procedure is 
designed to protect. Thus, a purely abstract injury (the deprivation 
of a right to information and public comment) is sufficient "injury- 
in-fact" as long as the plaintiff demonstrates a sufficiently tangible 
and ongoing interest in the resource that the procedure would pro- 
mote, but not guarantee, protection of. 
At some level, this distinction between procedural and substan- 
tive requirements must blur. Moreover, neither Def& of Wildlife 
nor any other case articulates any Article I11 or separationaf-powers 
rationale for a constitutional distinction between those statutory 
schemes deemed "procedural" and those deemed "substantive," 
much less any rationale that would justify' lRFS Article I11 enforceabil- 
ity for "substantive" statutory provisions. The question then is, why 
should not the overall Clean Water Act scheme, which sets up per- 
mitting procedures as well as effluent limitations, be considered to 
create rights in citizen plaintiffs worthy of protection so long as the 
plaintiffs demonstrate the requisite interest in the resource that 
would be protected by Clean Water Act procedures? 
Certain sections of the Clean Water Act are explicitly procedural, 
such as the requirement that Clean Water Act permits may be is- 
sued only after public notice and an opportunity for public com- 
ment.169 Other sections of the Clean Water Act explicitly create 
informational rights, such as the requirement that all discharge 
168. 42 U.S.C. 5 4332(C). 
169. CWA $5 402(a)(l), (b)(3), 33 U.S.C. 55 1342(a)(1), (b)(3). 
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monitoring reports filed by a discharger be publicly available.l70 
But the entire system of discharge bans, permit requirements, and 
technology- and water quality-based effluent limitations established 
by the Clean Water Act may also be viewed as systemic, or "proce- 
dural" provisions designed, like NEPA, to accomplish an overall en- 
hancement and improvement in the tangible conditions of water 
quality, without assuming that a tangible difference will be demon- 
strable in every case of compliance or non-comp1ian~e.l~~ 
So viewed, citizens enforcement of all aspects of the Clean Water 
Act permitting program from "substantiven effluent limitations to 
"procedural" public comment requirements to "informational" 
rights to discharge monitoring reports satisfies Defenden of Wzldlqe's 
"procedural" injury-in-fact requirements. It would make no sense 
that the owner of waterfront property would suffer a cognizable 
procedural "injury-in-factn if the chemical plant across the lake were 
issued a Clean Water Act permit in violation of public notice and 
comment requirements, but would lack the requisite "injury-in-fact" 
to enforce the effluent limitations incorporated into that permit ab- 
sent proof of specific, objectively perceivable damage to the body of 
water demonstrably resulting from the violation. Certainly, the wa- 
texfkont property owner's stake in the enforcement of the effluent 
limitation is every bit as weighty as a constitutional matter as his 
interest in the procedural protections applicable before the permit 
is issued. If the underlying interest in the resource affected is suB- 
cient to support constitutional recognition of his stake in seeing 
that the proper procedures are followed, this interest must also s u p  
port his interest in seeing that effluent limitations and other permit 
provisions designed to enhance water quality are also followed.172 
170. CWA §308(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1318(b). 
171. Ironically, in writing about the procedud rights granted by NEPA, and finding that 
deprivation of NEPA's procedud rights could constitute irreparable harm sufficient to sup  
port preliminary injunctive relief, then Judge (now Justice) Breyer used the Clean Water Act 
as an example of a statute that creates substantive, rather than procedural rights. Sierra Club 
v. Marsh, 872 F.2d 497,500 (1st Cir. 1989). As discussed in this article, however, the distinc- 
tion may not be quite so simple: the Clean Water Act includes explicitly procedural and 
informational requirements, and its substantive prohibitions are themselves part of an overall 
statutory scheme designed to enhance protection of the nation's waters much as NEPA set up 
procedures designed to enhance the nation's environment generally. 
172. Most citizens enforcement cases are brought by organizations on behalf of members 
who establish the requisite interest in the protected resource as individuals under the stan- 
dards articulated in Hunt v. Washington Apple Advert. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977). Ef- 
forts to establish organizational standing based on the organization's own interest and 
expertise in particular environmental irncs have been uniformly unsuccessful. See Sierra 
Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Lujan v. Defenders of Wddliie, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); 
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The Court's p r e - D e f i s  of Wildlife standing doctrine also pro- 
vides ample support for the enforceability of effluent limitations by 
citizen plaintiffs without proof of perceptible declinesin water qual- 
ity. As noted, the Duh Power Court recognized injury-in-fact based 
on prospective exposure to non-natural radiation, without requir- 
ing proof that the levels of exposure possible were likely to have 
perceptible health impacts.173 Similarly, exposure to "non-naturaln 
pollutants in a water body should be sufficient injury-in-fact to 
downstream users without proof that the levels of pollutants in- 
volved are likely to cause perceptible impacts. A demonstrable 
change in the environmental resource is sufficient, provided that the 
plaintiff establishes her interest in the resource affected. 
Sierra Club v. SCM Corp., 747 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1984). However, it may yet be possible for an 
organization to establish an organic organizational interest in a particular environmental 
resource, and base its standing directly on that interest The With  Circuit has recognized 
standing to enforce provisions-of the Endangered Species Act based on utility corpo&tions' 
economic interest in maintaining the health of an ecosystem (and thus being free from fur- 
ther restrictions on hydroelectric power use of the resource). Pacific Northwest Generating 
Coop. v. Brown, 38 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 1994). If a corporate economic interest is sufficient to 
support standing, then it follows that an eleemosynar$ corporation with a charter that explic- 
itly-pnts it an interest in preserving a particular environmental resource has a direct inter- 
est that is every bit as constitutionally valid as a for-profit corporation's economic interest in a 
resource. 
Many local and regional environmental organizations are in fact chartered for the specific 
purpose of protecting a particular regional environmental resource, such as the various river, 
bay, and sound "keeper" organizations. Seegenera& Robert F. Kennedy and Steven P. Solow, 
Environmental Litigation as Clinical Education: A Case Study, 8 J. Envt'l Law & Lit. 319,324 
(1993) (discussing Hudson Riverkeeper organization); Cmin v. B7owner, 898 F. Supp. 1052 
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (plaintiffs include Delaware Riverkeeper, San Francisco, Baykeeper, Puget 
Soundkeeper, Long Island Soundkeeper, and the Baykeeper for the New York and New 
Jersey ~ & b o r  ES&). These organi&ons ought to have-standig directly. Cf:.Friends of 
the Earth v. Chevron, 919 F. Supp. 1042 (rejecting representational standing, but noting that 
the plaintiff organization had failed to introduce any evidence of a direct interest in the 
environmental resource); Cf: aka Sierra Club v. Morton, supra, 405 U.S. at 744 ( ~ o u ~ l a s , j .  
dirsating) (noting that Sierra Club's charter makes the protection and consenation of the 
Sierra Nevada Mountains one of the principal purposes of the organization). 
173. Several courts have recognized that fear of health impacts due to exposure to envi- 
ronmental hazards is sufficient to support tort recovery, without proof that actual health 
effects have resulted. See, e.g., Watkins v. Fibreboard Corp., 994 F.2d 253 (5th Cir. 1993); 
Dartez v. Fibreboard Corp., 765 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1985); In re Moorenovich, 634 F. Supp. 
634 (D. Me. 1986); see gmeralb, 4 G e m d ,  Environmental Law Practice Guide $33.02[3] 
(1996). Such a fear of health impacts should likewise support standing for Article 111 pur- 
poses: certainly, an injury that would support ton recovevin state coun (and federal j&k- 
diction in a diversity case) must satisfy Article I11 injury-in-fact requirements. See aka Note, 
And Justiciability for All?: Future Injury Plaintiffs and the Separation of Powers, 109 Ham. L. 
Rev. 1066 (1996) (arguing that future injury tort plaintiffs must satisfy Article 111 standing 
requirements, and concluding that in most cases, they can). 
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In one of its very few dicta on citizens enforcement standing 
under the Clean Water Act, the Supreme Court also seems to have 
recognized that the effluent violation is itself the "injury-in-factn for 
standing purposes, and not the perceptible impacts on water quality 
that may or may not result from a given effluent violation. This is 
the only way to explain its suggestion in Gwal ty  that allegations of 
an ongoing effluent violation constituted the requisite Article I11 
injury-in-fact, and Justice Scalia's explicit statement (in dissent) that 
"[ilf . . . the defendant was in a state of compliance when this suit 
was filed, the plaintiffs would have been suffering no remediable 
injury-in-fact that could support suit." 
Defendant's "state of non-compliancen is itself the "injury-in-fact" 
that supports citizen standing. PoweU DufJiyn's rejection of the 
claim that the violation itself constitutes the injury is thus unneces- 
sarily restrictive even under Justice Scalia's approach to standing, 
which, it is fair to say, represents the strictest view of constitutional 
standing currently held by a Justice of the Supreme The 
"resource basedn approach to standing, which focuses on the plain- 
tiff s tangible relationship to the resource that is put at risk of harm 
by the defendant's violations, is more consonant with both the legis- 
lative intention of the Clean Water Act and current Supreme Court 
standing doctrine. 
B. Causation and Redressability 
Once the violation of Clean Water Act permit standards, proce- 
dural, or informational requirements is itself understood to give 
rise to injury-in-fact in a plaintiff with a protectable interest in the 
resource affected by the discharge of pollutants, the elements of 
"causation" and "redressabilityn become less problematic. Just as 
the NEPA plaintiff need not show that NEPA compliance would 
174. Needless to say, it seems likely that an approach to citizens enforcement suit standing 
which recognizes that violation of an effluent standard is per se an injury-in-fact to a plaintiff 
with sufficient interest in the aEected water body would garner the support of a majority of 
the current Court, given that Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Lujan explicitly recognized 
that "Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will 
give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before," Justice Stevens found standing 
in Lujan based on the plaintiffs' intangible professional interests in the species that might be 
afFected, and Justice O'Connerjoined Justice Blackmun's diient that would have found ade- 
quate procedural injury-in-fact to support standing. While it may be more difficult to predict 
the views of Justices Gisburg and Breyer (who have replaced Justices Blackmun and White 
on the Court), Justice Breyer's receptivity to the recognition of "irreparablen procedural in- 
jury in Sioro Club v. Marsh suggests a willingness to recognize non-uaditional injury in s u p  
port of environmental standing. 
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guarantee protection of the resource of concern from despoilment 
in order to establish standing, neither must the Clean Water Act 
citizen plaintiff establish that compliance would restore the waters 
of interest to their pristine condition, or even affect water quality in 
any tangible way. It is sufficient, as with so-called "procedural" 
rights under NEPA, that compliance with the Clean Water Act 
scheme would, overall, have the tendency to restore, protect, and 
improve the condition of the waters of interest, as contemplated by 
the Clean Water Act. 
The Clean Water Act violation is "redressable" in that an order of 
the court requiring compliance extinguishes the procedural, or 
schematic, injury suffered by the plaintiff. If the violation consists 
of an exceedence of an effluent limitation, compliance ends the 
plaintiffs "exposure to non-natural" substances in the water body, 
to borrow a phrase from the Duk.e Power Court, at least to the extent 
that the contribution of such substances violates the law. This un- 
derstanding of the causation element in Clean Water Act citizen 
suits is implicit in Justice Scalia's dissent in Gwaltney, suggesting that 
cessation of the violation itself ends plaintiffs "injury-in-fact," re- 
dressing the injury that is the basis of suit. And, as acknowledged by 
the Fourth Circuit in the Gwaltnty remand, assessment of penalties 
by the court serves to redress plaintiffs injuries by having both a 
special deterrent affect on future violations by the defendant before 
the court, as well as the general deterrent effect on other polluters 
of the same water body who may learn by e~a.rnp1e.l~~ 
This approach to citizens enforcement standing is simple to a p  
ply and avoids embroiling the courts in the determination of con- 
tested issues of expert testimony just to determine jurisdiction to 
175. Several commentators have criticized reliance on the deterrence impact of civil pen- 
alties to establish redressability. See Comment, Moomess and Citizen Suit Civil Penalty 
Claims under the Clean Water Acc A Post Lujan Reassessment, 25 Envt'l L. 801 (1995); 
Note, Ignoring the Trees for the Forest: How the Citizens Suit Provision of the Clean Water 
Act V~olates the Constitution's Separation of Powers Principle, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1957 (1995). 
These commentators rely on Linda RS. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973), a case in which 
the Supreme Court rejected the standing of a plaintiff to challenge the State's failure to 
enforce child support laws, finding that the plaintiffs injury (lack of child support) would 
not be redressed if her ex-husband were thrown in jail. Canied to its logical extreme, how- 
ever, then no noneconomic inju~y would ever be redressable, as the defendant might always 
choose to incur contempt sanctions rather than comply with a court's injunctive order. 
Moreover, the Linda RS. Court stated that its holding was limited to the unique circum- 
stances of a constitutional challenge of a decision not to prosecute, id at 619, and in the 
absence of a congressionally created grant of standing, id at 617 & n.3. Neither of these 
factors is present in a Clean Water Act citizens enforcement suit 
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hear a citizen suit claim. Instead, the court need only address the 
sufficiency of the plaintiffs recreational, aesthetic, and environ- 
mental interest in the water body that is potentially affected, pre- 
cisely as contemplated by the Supreme Court in its decisions 
ranging from Morton through footnote seven of Def& of Wildlif. 
This approach is also clearly intended by Congress in its definition 
of "citizen" as one "having an interest which is or may be adversely 
affected," and by explicit reference in the legislative history to the 
MdmL test. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Contrary to many predictions, the environmental citizens en- 
forcement suit remains alive and well even after the Supreme 
Court's decision in Lujan v. Def&s of Wildlife, Although the very 
broadest assertions of standing, without individualized injury, re- 
main problematic after D e f i  of Wildlife, they are no more so 
than before Defenders of Wildlife. The traditional basis of citizens' 
enforcement standing - based on individual recreational and aes- 
thetic enjoyment of the resource that might be affected - enjoys 
additional support from Def&s of WiIdlife's recognition that "pro- 
cedural" standing need not be based on strict causation and redres- 
sability. Although the courts have yet to pick up on this distinction 
and adopt an enforcement standing doctrine more consonant with 
Congress' intended extension of standing to all those who satisfy 
the Siara Club v. Mort012 test for interest in an environmental re- 
source, neither has there been a general retrenchment in enforce- 
ment standing doctrine. Ultimately, the issue may yet need to be 
resolved by a Supreme Court that, by its own dicta, remains open to 
some level of Congressionally defined injuries and Congressionally 
articulated chains of causation. 
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